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1 INTRODUCTION  TO  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  MARKET  AND 
CURRENCY TRADING
The  modern  foreign  exchange  market  started  to  form  in  the  early  1970s  when 
developed countries gradually switched from fixed exchange rates (also called the 
Bretton  Woods  system)  to  floating  exchange rates.  The foreign  exchange market 
determines exchange rates for floating currencies. An exchange rate is a price of one 
currency in terms of another currency and, therefore, it transfers purchasing power 
from one currency to another.  Each currency has a bilateral exchange rate against 
each  other  currency.  In  principle,  trading a  currency is  only a  partial  investment 
decision since investors still need to decide which underlying asset to trade, e.g. cash, 
money-market instruments, or bonds. In practice, currency values can be speculated 
just like any other asset prices making the foreign exchange market really a market 
on its own and by far the biggest market in the world with its average daily turnover 
of $4,0 trillion ($ = U.S. dollars). In comparison, the average daily turnover of world 
stock exchanges (dark pools not included) was $200 billion in the beginning of 2012 
(World Federation of Exchanges 2012). The rise of currency trading has been fast 
from $1,7 trillion in 1998 and $1,0 trillion in 1992. Around $1,5 trillion of the current 
total  volume is  traded  in  spot  foreign  exchange  transactions  and  $2,5  trillion  in 
currency  derivatives  (mainly  forward  contracts  and  swaps).  The  turnover  in  the 
derivatives market is growing more rapidly, which means that its proportion is going 
to increase further. (Bank for International Settlements 2010.) Currencies are traded 
multiple times more than what is required for trade in goods and services. Around 
90%  is  based  on  global  investments  and  only  10%  on  imports  and  exports. 
(Pekkarinen & Sutela 2002: 144, 277.)
The foreign exchange market is geographically decentralized and works over-the-
counter  (OTC)  via  a  worldwide  dealer  network.  However,  there  are  some  more 
important trading centers where many of the biggest market players operate. London 
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is the most significant one with an approximate one third proportion of all currency 
trading. New York and Tokyo come next, Auckland, Sydney, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Frankfurt, and San Francisco being the other important locations. (Sager & Taylor 
2006.)  Besides  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  centralized  exchange  or  regulatory 
authority, foreign exchange trading differs from the equity and bond markets since 
there are only limited number of currency pairs to choose from, whereas for instance 
the stock market  has thousands of stocks.  U.S. dollar is  by far the most  popular 
currency traded being involved in 84,9% of all currency transactions. Euro, Japanese 
yen, and British pound come next (see Table 1). The dominance of the dollar may 
seem overwhelming but actually its share has little bit decreased during the past ten 
years. (Bank for International Settlements 2010.) There are many reasons for that 
phenomenon, which could be a topic of an entire research. To name a few important 
ones,  the  emergence  of  the  euro  has  diminished  the  usage  of  the  dollar  in 
international trade. Moreover, the economic difficulties and all the time worsening 
budget deficit that the United States has faced/is facing have eaten dollar's share. 
Globalization and the growing importance of emerging markets around the world 
have  ensured  that  today there  are  more  actively traded  currency pairs  than  ever 
before. Some currency pairs are not traded with large volumes and their exchange 
rate is determined through their relationship to a widely used third currency, most 
often  to  the  U.S.  dollar.  Because  exchange  rates  are  relative  values  between 
currencies, all of the exchange rates have to be in balance relative to each other in 
order to cancel out any arbitrage opportunity. This highlights the role of the dollar-
denominated cross rates in determining other exchange rates.
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Table 1. Shares of individual currencies in foreign exchange trading.
Currency Share
USD 84.9%
EUR 39.1%
JPY 19.0%
GBP 12.9%
AUD 7.6%
CHF 6.4%
CAD 5.3%
HKD 2.4%
SEK 2.2%
NZD 1.6%
NOK 1.3%
Other 17.7%
Total 200.0%
Because there are two currencies involved in each transaction, the sum of percentages of individual currencies 
totals 200% instead of 100% (Bank for International Settlements 2010).
The foreign exchange market has some institutional features as its two-tier market 
structure  affects  how the  currency  values  are  determined.  The  two-tier  structure 
means that trading is conducted via different channels depending on the participant. 
Dealers operate within the order-driven interdealer market, where over half of the 
total volume is traded mainly for purposes of speculation or inventory control (of 
dealers' positions) after an imbalance is created by a customer trade. The trading of 
customers with dealers is quote-driven and represents roughly the other half. (Sager 
& Taylor  2006.) Nowadays  also  individual  investors  are  able  to  take  part  in  the 
currency trading thanks to the emergence of internet based dealers, who accept also 
smaller trade sizes. Still in the 1990s foreign exchange trading was mostly conducted 
by big players such as financial institutions, multinational corporations, and others 
alike. (Sarno & Taylor 2001.)  Dealers act often as market makers determining bid-
ask spreads, facilitating trades, and providing liquidity. For each currency pair there 
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are many dealers, who post their quotes on one of the electronic interdealer limit 
order books, where buyers and sellers are matched automatically. The top two of the 
most traded currency pairs (euro-dollar and dollar-yen) are traded primarily on EBS, 
while  the  third  (pound-dollar)  is  traded  primarily  on  Reuters  FXFX.  These  two 
platforms,  EBS and Reuters,  are overwhelmingly the two largest  trading avenues 
within the interdealer market.  (Chaboud et  al.  2007.)  After incoming orders have 
been executed there is no regulatory obligation to publish the detailed information 
about the trades. This makes the foreign exchange market very different from the 
highly  regulated  stock  market.  Furthermore,  customers'  orders  are  held  only  by 
individual dealers, which means that there is neither public information about the 
current bid and ask prices nor volume for any particular currency pair. So, although 
its huge size and apparent liquidity, the foreign exchange market is rather opaque. 
(Cerrato et al.  2011.) This lack of transparency has important implications on the 
price formation of the currencies and it will be discussed later with more details.
The goal of this paper is to obtain a thorough comprehension of the foreign exchange 
market and the pricing process of exchange rates. The main focus is on the most 
popular currency trading strategy, carry trade, which is defined as borrowing low-
yielding currencies and lending/investing in high-yielding currencies. At some future 
date the proceeds from lending to the high interest rate currency are used to cover the 
loan in the low interest rate currency. The balance, which consists of interest rate 
differential and exchange rate change, shows the gained profit/loss from the carry 
trade.  If  Uncovered  Interest  Rate  Parity  (UIP)  held,  carry  trade  should  not  be 
profitable as exchange rate change should eliminate any gain arising from interest 
rate differential. Hence, carry trade is speculating against UIP. If carry trade succeeds 
to  provide  returns,  the  exchange rate  does  not  offset  the interest  rate  differential 
between  the  two  countries.  Most  empirical  evidence,  including  my  own  initial 
analysis, agrees that most of the time the offset is not complete and sometimes the 
exchange  rate  even  moves  to  the  opposite  way,  i.e.  carry  trade  target  currency 
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appreciates against the funding currency that is just the opposite what UIP predicts. 
This suggests that in addition to the interest rate gain investors can earn also positive 
currency return. Furthermore, since interest rate changes are rarely large, carry trade 
portfolios  have  traditionally  been  quite  stable.  Therefore,  the  need  to  rebalance 
occurs only seldom keeping the transaction costs marginal. It is no wonder that carry 
trade, which aims to exploit the UIP failure, has become very popular among foreign 
exchange investors.
When one takes into account the foreign exchange market's high volume, free flow 
of capital over borders, and the speculative nature, it is difficult to understand why 
carry trade strategies deliver excess returns. Certainly this does not happen always 
because  carry  trade  contains  great  risks.  Investors  want  to  avoid  rapid 
appreciation/revaluation  of  the  funding  currency  they  have  borrowed  and 
depreciation/devaluation  of  the  target  currency  they  have  invested  in.  It  is  also 
worthwhile to highlight that interest rate difference is not constant but varies over 
time. In this study, the effects of the difference fluctuations on carry trade returns are 
examined. Also the size for the UIP failure is disputable. Some researchers argue that 
the findings are statistically not very far from the UIP equilibrium state and can be 
accounted for  transaction  costs.  For  instance,  Baldwin (1990) argues  that  even a 
relatively small transaction cost together with uncertainty about the future exchange 
rate  produce  a  “hysteresis  band” where  expected  carry trade returns  are  too  low 
compared to the costs. Hence, exchange rate movements to the UIP equilibrium state 
happen  only  when  interest  rate  differential  is  high  enough  compared  to  the 
transaction  costs.  Because  of  transaction  costs,  portfolio  rebalancing  inevitable 
becomes more infrequent accumulating the deviations. As the size of the deviations 
has been under heavy debate, it will be checked once more in this paper with the 
most current data of daily exchange rates and interest rates of G10 countries in 1997-
2012.
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As carry trade clearly turns out to be a profitable trading strategy, this paper aims to 
identify proper explanations for this so called forward premium puzzle. In order to 
do so different risk concepts and market anomalies need to be discussed extensively. 
The usual explanations that have been forwarded include: opportunity costs, central 
bank interventions,  peso problems,  other  time-varying risk factors,  and investors' 
irrationality. So far none of the explanations have succeeded to offer solid and all 
pleasing solution to the puzzle although majority of the academics seem to agree on 
the existence of time-varying risk premium. However, the modelling of it remains a 
challenge  since  many of  the  models  fail  out-of-sample.  Ideally  good time  series 
modelling  should  describe  both  short-term  dynamics  and  long-term  equilibrium 
simultaneously.  This  paper  is  part  of  the  recent  literature,  which  emphasizes 
nonlinear  dynamics  in  the  UIP  relationship  and  utilizes  Smooth  Transition 
Regression -model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes, how exchange rates should be 
determined, if the pricing process was all about fundamentals. Section 3 explains the 
role  and  behaviour  of  central  banks  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Section  4 
describes the data and the portfolio construction as well as the initial results. Section 
5 presents the theoretical background that is built around the role of risk-aversion in 
asset  pricing.  Section 6 takes a deep look on the risk based explanations  for the 
documented  excess  returns.  Section  7  considers  behavioral  biases  and  market 
frictions that can result in market inefficiencies and excess returns. Section 8 is all 
about modelling the carry trade returns by STR-model and testing whether the risk-
aversion induced nonlinearities can be exploited and create economic value. Section 
9 concludes.
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2 EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
2.1 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
When  considering  exchange  rate  formation,  two  famous  cornerstone  parity 
conditions stand out, Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) and Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP). According to UIP, the difference in nominal interest rates between two 
countries determines the movement of the exchange rate between their  respective 
currencies: the currency of the country with the lower interest rate appreciates and 
the  currency  with  the  higher  interest  rate  depreciates  until  the  equilibrium  is 
achieved.  Investors  in  either  of  the  currencies  would  achieve  the  same  average 
return,  i.e.  an  investor  with  a  lower  interest  rate  would  get  a  gain  from  the 
appreciation of the currency,  whereas  another  investor  with a  higher  interest  rate 
would  lose  in  the  form  of  depreciation  of  the  currency.  Investors  should  be 
indifferent  between  holding  risk-free  securities  in  either  of  the  currencies  since 
excess returns on average should not be possible to earn. (Chinn 2007.)
Equation (1) describes the UIP mechanism:
(1+r t
*)=
E (S T )
(S t)
∗(1+r t) (1)
where rt* and rt are the current foreign and domestic interest rates, respectively, for 
the period from t (when investment is made) to T (when investment matures), St is 
the current spot exchange rate expressed in terms of  foreign currency per unit  of 
domestic  currency,  and  E(ST)  is  the  expected  spot  exchange  rate  at  time  T.  An 
investor executing carry trade is exposed to the uncertainty of the future exchange 
rate,  E(ST),  which is  the only unknown variable  in the equation (1).  Thus,  if  the 
future exchange rate differs from the one predicted by UIP, it is both a profit-making 
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opportunity and a risk. The exposure to this exchange rate risk can be covered with 
the use of currency forward contract.  Then,  interest  rate  parity is  called  Covered 
Interest Rate Parity (CIP). It differs from UIP that it does not wait the exchange rate 
to adjust by itself but instead fixes it with the forward rate Ft, see equation (2).
(1+rt
*)=
F t
S t
∗(1+rt) (2)
Ft is  derived  from the  current  interest  rate  differential  thereby fulfilling  the  no-
arbitrage equilibrium condition, see equation (3).  If UIP held, the expected future 
spot rate E(ST) should naturally match with Ft.
F t=S t∗
(1+r t
*)
(1+r t)
(3)
Forward  premium/discount  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  prevailing 
forward  Ft and spot  St rates.  When forward rate  is  higher/(lower)  than spot  rate, 
forward rate is said to be on premium/(discount).  If UIP held,  forward premium/
(discount)  should  be  equal  to  the  coming  appreciation/(depreciation)  that  is  the 
current interest rate differential. In common language forward premium is used to 
indicate also forward discount (minus sign though). (Akram et al. 2008.) Interest rate 
differential is not the only variable to be looked at because there are also different 
compounding frequencies across different  bonds,  e.g.  U.S. government  bonds are 
compounded  semi-annually  and  European  bonds  annually.  Especially  at  longer 
maturities  the  compounding  frequency is  important.  For  simplicity,  most  authors 
calculate forward rates by using continuous compounding, which will also be the 
approach of this paper, see equation (4).
F t=S t e
(rt
*−r t)T (4)
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T is time to maturity of the forward contract and e is the number of Neper. Hence, the 
expected change in the spot exchange rate from time t to T can be calculated in either 
of the following ways, see equations (5) and (6).
E (Δ S t →T )=e
(rt
*−rt )T−1 (5)
E (Δ S t →T )=ln (
F t
S t
)=ln ( F t)− ln (S t) (6)
Academics have acknowledged that for both UIP and CIP to hold, capital must be 
allowed to flow free across borders and the risk-free assets of the two countries must 
be perfect substitutes (e.g. Meredith & Chinn 1998, Twomey 2010). In general, the 
capital markets of developed countries are highly integrated but this is not the case 
with  some  less  developed  countries,  which  have  fixed  exchange  rates,  capital 
restrictions, and other regulations on their currency. Thus, UIP and CIP should be 
tested  among  freely  floating  currencies.  Perfect  substitutability  is  needed  to 
distinguish  asset  risk  from  exchange  rate  risk.  This  is  more  complicated  thing 
especially when interest  rate  parities  are  tested among lots  of currencies because 
”risk-free”  assets  across  different  countries  are  not  perfect  substitutes  but  have 
different  levels  of  risk,  e.g.  credit  risk.  In  history some countries have defaulted 
bonds and may do so again that has became apparent in the times of euro crisis of 
2011-2012.  Neither  is  liquidity  same  for  bonds  across  different  countries.  Big 
countries'  bonds  are  much  more  liquid  than  small  countries'  counterparts  and 
therefore also less risky. These facts should be taken into account when testing UIP 
and CIP.
In general, deviations from CIP are very small, which means that forward exchange 
rate covers well the interest rate differential between two countries. Hence, it does 
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not matter whether one uses equation (5) or (6) to predict the expected change in the 
exchange  rate.  Even  though  CIP  holds  well  empirical  evidence  sees  frequent 
violations of UIP. The failure of UIP, which was first documented by Hansen and 
Hodrick (1980), Bilson (1981), Meese and Rogoff (1983), and Fama (1984), is also 
called the forward premium puzzle/anomaly indicating the fact that currency forward 
prices are calculated by using current spot exchange rate and interest rate differential 
between the countries.  Carry trade can be equally implemented by selling forward 
currencies that are at a forward premium and buying forward currencies that are at a 
forward discount. If UIP held, forward exchange rate should provide a close estimate 
of the future spot exchange rate. In reality, the interest rate differentials are often bad 
predictors of future spot exchange rates resulting in situations where spot exchange 
rate falls when the forward exchange rate would have predicted it to rise and vice 
versa.
The actual change in the spot exchange rate and thereby the validity of UIP is usually 
estimated by using the following time series regressions, see equations (7) and (8).
Δ S t→T=ST−S t=α+β (rt
*−rt)+ε t →T (7)
Δ S t→T=α+β ( F t−S t)+ε t →T (8)
If UIP held perfectly, the regressions above should give an intercept (α) of zero and a 
slope coefficient (β) of one. Therefore, a small alpha and a beta close to one would 
indicate a good model. If beta is very low, UIP cannot explain the returns or the risk 
of carry trade and we would need a better  model.  The error terms (ε) should be 
random and have a mean of zero.  The literature refers to  “forward premium bias” 
when the estimated slope coefficient is less than one and “forward premium puzzle” 
when  the  coefficient  is  negative.  Quite  often the  coefficient,  indeed,  is  negative 
meaning that the currency with the  higher/(lower)  interest rate tends to  appreciate/
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(depreciate). (e.g. Chaboud & Wright 2005, Mark & Moh 2007.) This would be ideal 
outcome for investors implementing carry trade.
2.2 Purchasing Power Parity
Another widely used equilibrium model, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), states that 
an exchange rate between two currencies is in equilibrium when their  purchasing 
power is the same in each country. In other words, national price levels should be the 
same when expressed in a common currency. PPP is founded on the law of one price: 
if  two countries  produce  an  identical  product,  and there  are  no trade  barriers  or 
transportation costs, the prices of the identical products should have the same (one) 
price  in  different  markets  throughout  the  world.  Instead  of  observing  individual 
product  prices,  PPP concentrates  on  nationwide  price  levels.  If  price  levels  are 
different between two countries, according to PPP the exchange rate will adjust to the 
equilibrium where  prices  equal.  For  example,  if  price  level  is  lower/(higher)  in 
another country, its currency is undervalued/(overvalued) and its value is likely to 
rise/(decline)  as  long as  the equilibrium is  achieved.  (Taylor  et  al.  2001.)  If  two 
countries have differing rates of inflation, then the relative price levels between the 
countries will change. Inflation makes purchasing power to fall and hence a country 
with a lower/(higher) inflation will have higher/(lower) purchasing power compared 
to the counterpart. According to PPP this cannot sustain in long-run and the exchange 
rate will adjust to the purchasing power difference like it was described above.
Purchasing power of a currency relative to another is called real exchange rate. If 
PPP held perfectly, the real exchange rate would be constant and equal to one. Thus, 
any variation in the real exchange rate would represent deviations from PPP. These 
deviations should not be persistent and therefore PPP predicts real exchange rates to 
be mean-reverting that becomes visible especially in long-term.  (Begg et al. 2003: 
402-403.)  PPP is  longer-term theory  compared  to  UIP as  short-term changes  in 
15
exchange  rates  cannot  immediately  affect  the  price  levels  of  different  countries. 
Indeed, Korhonen (2005) finds that exchange rate changes do not fully convert to 
consumer price changes, i.e. inflation is not as sensitive as exchange rate movements. 
One obvious reason is stiff competition, which makes companies willing to reduce 
their profit margins in order to maintain market shares.
In economics literature PPP is perhaps the most important of the macroeconomic 
fundamentals  determining exchange rates  but unfortunately it  cannot  be tested in 
perfect circumstances. Real exchange rates are not directly observable but need to be 
constructed  via  national  price  levels  that  themselves  are  just  proxies.  Moreover, 
because PPP is built upon unrealistic assumptions like the absence of trade barriers 
and transportation costs,  it  has not much predictive power for most products and 
services. The main exception is financial  markets,  where identical securities must 
have the same price no matter how they are created. If they did not have the same 
price, speculators would exploit these arbitrage opportunities very rapidly. In most 
other markets perfect competition does not exist  but suppliers are  able to charge 
different  prices  in  different  locations.  Mishkin  (2006:  435-437) argues  that  more 
realistic model of PPP is based on relative price levels, which does not consider strict 
equilibrium state,  but simply states that a rise/(decline)  in  a country's  price level 
relative to the foreign price level causes its currency to depreciate/(appreciate). Thus, 
it is in line with PPP with the exception that the likely exchange rate change does not  
need to achieve a certain equilibrium point.
2.3 Mean-reversion
The predictive power of PPP is stronger when the forecast horizon is extended. This 
is due to slow mean-reversion of exchange rates that only becomes visible over long 
horizon.  Dumas (1992) finds that the relationship between real exchange rates and 
PPP is nonlinear and mean-reverting: the larger the deviation from the PPP condition, 
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the faster the reversion towards it. When deviations are not large, reversion may not 
happen at all because transaction costs are too big relative to potential gains. Also 
Cheung and Laib (1994) find support for mean-reversion in real exchange rates of 
nine  different  countries  (Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S.) by utilizing nominal exchange rates as well as 
consumer and wholesale price indexes in 1900-1992. Taylor et al. (2001) agree that 
real exchange rates are mean-reverting. They construct real exchange rates for dollar, 
yen, pound, franc, and deutschemark in 1973-1996. The mean-reversion is nonlinear 
strengthening hand in hand with the size of the deviation from PPP equilibrium. In 
other words, the speed of adjustment is not constant.  This can be due to arbitrage 
costs, which enable small deviations.
Since real and nominal exchange rates are highly correlated, it would be strange if 
mean-reversion is present with real exchange rates but absent with nominal exchange 
rates. Sweeney (2006) studies G10 nominal exchange rates in 1974-1996 and finds 
them to be mean-reverting. Mean-reversion is caused mainly by central banks and is 
therefore time- and country-specific. During the research period the major players 
were  the  U.S.  and  German  central  banks,  which  jointly  targeted  stable  dollar-
deutschemark exchange rate. Other G10 countries stabilized their exchange rates to 
either of these two major western currencies. So, on average all the G10 exchange 
rates stayed inside certain limits and bounced back if the limits were crossed. This 
naturally rises a question whether perfectly floating exchange rates would experience 
such mean-reversion. Surely nominal exchange rates vary more than real exchange 
rates but still  the deviations cannot continue forever without affecting the overall 
economy and competitiveness of the country. Moreover, since all the central banks 
intervene the foreign exchange market, we do not have to answer to the question but 
instead it is enough that we accept some degree of long-term mean-reversion. The 
equilibrium does not have to be constant but it can develop over time and in practice 
the  exchange  rate  changes  can  be  huge.  With  quite  similar  inflation  levels,  the 
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exchange rate of the two world's biggest currencies, dollar and euro, has fluctuated 
heavily. For example, in 2002/04/01 the euro traded at $0.88 and exactly six years 
later in 2008/04/01 at $1.56, which means over 75% rise. Although today we are 
somewhere between these numbers, mean-reversion does not offer much help for 
predicting short-term exchange rate changes what is the ultimate goal of this paper.
2.4 The relationship between UIP and PPP
Inflation determines time value of money. The higher the expected inflation, the less 
appealing it is to receive money in the future compared to today. This has severe 
consequences for the economy and therefore too high inflation needs to be tackled. 
The main vehicle is to increase interest rates. Hence, interest rate changes mirror the 
expectations of future inflation.  (Begg et al.  2003: 368-369.)  Via this link UIP is 
connected to PPP. Most of the time they are reinforcing the effect of each other on 
exchange rates simply because high inflation (PPP predicts currency depreciation) is 
usually  accompanied  by high  interest  rates  (UIP predicts  depreciation)  and  vice 
versa. For example, Froot and Thaler (1990: 187) argue that UIP works better when 
higher/(lower) interest rate is accompanied by higher/(lower) inflation. Also Twomey 
(2010) points out that UIP fails particularly when PPP does not hold between the 
countries. Nevertheless, sometimes these forces can be in conflict highlighting the 
fact that PPP is derived from goods market and UIP from capital market. Brière and 
Drut  (2009)  compare  the  performance  of  carry  trade  and  PPP strategies  for  28 
currency pairs in 1990-2008. The performance of carry trade strategy is significantly 
better  than that  of  PPP strategy,  but  it  fluctuates  widely over  time.  PPP strategy 
performs better in crises that is no surprise since financial crises are periods of a 
sudden return back to fundamentals. The authors suggest that a portfolio, which is 
built around these two strategies, outperforms a pure carry trade strategy and would 
be robust to crises.
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Furthermore, PPP and UIP have a crucial difference in the perception of time. In PPP 
context time is not important because exchange rate equilibrium is not time-specific 
but just a certain point where national price levels equal. On the contrary, new UIP 
conditions  need to  be  constructed  continuously if  the  interest  rates  do  not  equal 
across  countries,  i.e.  UIP predicts  that  high  interest  rate  currencies  continue  to 
depreciate against low interest rate currencies as long as there is a difference in the 
interest  rates. If the predicted depreciation was limited only to the periods where 
interest  rates  changed,  carry  trade  would  get  free  lunches  on  the  periods  where 
interest rate difference was static. UIP's obvious drawback is that the exchange rate 
would one day approach to zero if the interest rate difference continues to be positive 
for the high interest rate currency. Surely, this does not make sense. For curiosity let's 
think what would happen if the high interest rate currency continues to depreciate 
like predicted by UIP. Its  currency value would get very low making its  exports 
competitive but imports and foreign debt too expensive. In long-run this would be 
unsustainable and in conflict with PPP. Because real exchange rates mean-revert in 
long-horizon, perhaps UIP explains better shorter-term fluctuations. But then, if we 
accept that UIP does not need to work in long-term, carry trade implemented for 
instance  by  30-year  government  bonds  can  be  profitable.  This  may be  too  long 
investment period for most investors to exploit and definitely we cannot proof it to 
one way or another due to lack of reliable data.  During this paper I will point out 
further questions, which still remain unanswered but would be more than interesting 
to find out. One of them comes from the fact that carry trade can be conducted on 
various  investment  periods.  The  nature  of  carry  trade  becomes  slightly  different 
when investment horizon is lengthened. Chapters 6.1 and 6.2 provide some empirical 
evidence and aim to clarify the differing risk profiles of various investment horizons.
2.5 Equilibrium derived from effective exchange rates
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For individual currency pairs a working equilibrium condition can be derived from 
each country's nominal effective exchange rate, which is a weighted average of its 
individual bilateral exchange rates. With effective exchange rate difference we may 
know  the  probable  long-term  direction  in  the  exchange  rate.  Being  a  weighted 
average  it  should  be  more  stable  and  therefore  also  more  useful  compared  to 
individual exchange rates or purchasing power parities. Usually the basket weights 
are determined by the trade shares with each country assigning higher weights to 
important  trading  partners  but  GDP  weighted  effective  exchange  rate  is  quite 
common as well. (Begg et al. 2003: 398.) The latter approach gives highest weight to 
the U.S. dollar and may be more appropriate when considering the global foreign 
exchange market. If a currency's effective exchange rate is taken as the equilibrium 
state,  it  is  possible  to  track  the  deviations  (potential  mispricings)  of  individual 
exchange rates from this correctly priced equilibrium. Deviations from equilibrium 
condition are  calculated as a percentage difference between funding currency's and 
target currency's nominal effective exchange rates. Hence, this indicator is relative to 
the other currencies and does not tell what should the absolute value of the currency 
be. The trouble of relying on effective exchange rate difference comes from the fact 
that it  takes the equilibrium state to be constant that does not change at all.  This 
surely is not true but the equilibrium can evolve over time depending on the country's 
economic development and competitiveness. Furthermore, with portfolio approach 
we cannot rely on individual currency pairs' effective exchange rate differences.
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3 ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS AND THEIR IMPACT ON EXCHANGE 
RATES
3.1 Role of central banks
In the foreign exchange market not all players are motivated by profit making, which 
is the very core of market efficiency based asset pricing theories. Heavy central bank 
participation makes the foreign exchange market together with fixed income market 
unique from other financial markets as the asset prices (exchange rates and interest 
rates) are  not let  to move free. Because money plays  an important role affecting 
aggregate economic  activity and generating business  cycles, it  is  no wonder  that 
central  banks want to optimize the amount and cost of money for their  domestic 
economies. In order to do so, each central bank conducts monetary policy that is the 
management  of money supply and interest  rates.  The central  banks of developed 
countries have identified price stability as their primary target. Other important goals 
include high employment, economic growth, and stability of financial markets, as 
well  as  keeping  their  currency  value  optimal  to  the  aggregate  economy and  its 
volatility as low as possible. Especially in short-term the goals can be in conflict with 
each other, i.e. targeting one goal can result to a failure of another goal. (Mishkin 
2006: 393-398.)
The main vehicle  for inflation targeting is  interest  rate.  Central  banks attempt to 
affect the level of interest rates by target rates, which they try to reinforce by open 
market operations. Monetary policies impact mainly the short-end of the yield curve 
while the rest of the yield curve is determined more by the demand for country's  
bonds. However, if the market does not believe the target rate to be correct, the level  
shift of the yield curve may not happen. For example, in December 2011 European 
Central Bank lowered its target rate to 1.0% in order to ease the credit crisis and 
boost the economic growth. This did not lower even the short-term interest rates for 
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instance of Italy or Spain, not to mention Greece. In turn, the short-end of Germany's  
yield curve fell below 0.0% in January 2012 because of the huge demand for its 
bonds that were viewed as safer.  Euro is a case of its own as there are different 
countries  with  different  inflation,  credit,  and  liquidity  risks  using  one  and  same 
currency.  During the euro crisis  there have been large capital  flows from riskier 
countries into safer countries. It is not always easy to see the effect on the common 
currency as much of the money has simply moved from Southern Europe to Northern 
Europe.  Overall,  the euro area has lost  investments and the euro has depreciated 
against most other currencies.
Large interest rate changes rarely occur as central banks want to keep the inflation as 
stable as possible. Only if a country faces unexpected and rapidly rising economic 
crisis,  e.g.  hyperinflation,  central  bank  may  conduct  large  target  rate  changes. 
However, typical target currencies, whose interest rates are already higher, do not 
have as much leeway as funding currencies to rise them further. On the other hand, if  
a  country  is  in  a  recession  and  the  economy needs  money  stimulation,  funding 
currencies cannot lower them much further if at all compared to target currencies, 
which in this case have more leeway. Jylhä and Suominen (2011) find that changes in 
interest rates are positively and significantly correlated with changes in inflation risk 
and money supply. The latter one is surprising since an increase in the money supply 
is usually said to lower interest rates (liquidity effect). The relationship is, however, 
more complicated. Interest rates can rise later on because larger money supply has an 
expansionary influence  on  the  economy and increases  the  price  level  (inflation). 
Thus, inflation risk seems to be the key determinant of interest rates as it affects both 
independently and as a result of money supply.
Other main tools of central banks are open market operations, money printing, and 
reserve requirements (money multiplier). In general, increasing money supply and 
lowering interest rates boost economic growth and decreases unemployment. On the 
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minus side they lead to higher inflation in long-term cancelling out the gained short-
term benefits. Hence,  the monetary policy is  balancing between optimal inflation 
level  and economic  activity,  and therefore  conducted on temporary basis:  money 
supply is increased during recessions and tightened when the economy expands too 
quickly in order to keep the inflation under control. (Veronesi 2010: 239, 242.) As we 
can see, motives and means of central bank interventions vary over time depending 
on the current health of the economy, the future prospects, and the ideology that the 
central bank is implementing.
What is the role of exchange rates in this jigsaw? It is important to remember that 
changes in exchange rates are caused by actual monetary flows (demand and supply) 
and expected changes in them. These in turn are an outcome of external factors like 
monetary  policies  by  central  banks,  fiscal  policies  by  governments  (budget, 
spending, taxation), and investor behaviour. Ceteris paribus, a currency is expected to 
appreciate/(depreciate) if 1) the domestic money supply decreases/(increases), 2) the 
demand  for  the  currency  increases/(decreases),  3)  the  domestic  GDP increases/
(decreases), 4) country's has current account, budget, and trade surpluses/(deficits), 
5)  the  domestic  inflation  is  lower/(higher)  than  the  inflation  in  another  country 
improving/(reducing)  the  currency's  purchasing  power,  6)  trade  barriers  are 
increased/(decreased), 7) country's productivity improves/(worsens). (Mishkin 2006: 
437-439.) Healthy economy generally indicates good performance of the currency as 
there will be extra demand for its currency thanks to more incoming investments and 
exports. This is of course the other way around for a currency of a troubled economy. 
Therefore,  currency investors  follow closely news  and indicators  about  country's 
economic and political health, e.g. GDP, inflation, interest rates, employment figures, 
producer price index, nonfarm payrolls, and retail sales are among the most widely 
followed. In reality, ceteris paribus condition is hardly ever met making the described 
relationships more blurred. Their exact synergy is more than difficult to identify and 
no  one  can  be  sure  about  their  total  impact  on  the  currency  value.  This  only 
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highlights the fact that the conduct of monetary policy can be very complex.
Also the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates is more puzzling even 
though UIP predicts a very clear pattern. According to UIP, interest rates are the only 
factor moving exchange rates. In its strictest sense this is certainly false as it does not 
take into account the existence of trading costs. Also the sign of an exchange rate 
change is disputable because there are forces driving the exchange rate also to the 
other direction than predicted by UIP. The strength of the forces is tightly connected 
to  the  aggregate  risk-aversion  level  among investors.  When risk-aversion  is  low/
(high), higher interest rates look attractive/(risky) in search for the highest/(safest) 
yields. Hence, interest rates give investors a reason to shift money from one country 
to  another  and  these  capital  flows  across  countries  can  have  a  large  effect  on 
exchange  rate  movements.  Remember  that  only  a  fraction  of  the  total  currency 
trading  is  caused  by  international  trade  and  the  vast  majority  is  due  to  global 
investments.  In times of low risk-aversion this can lead to appreciation of the high 
interest rate currencies that is exactly the opposite to the UIP. Later we will learn 
more about this phenomenon.
3.2 How central banks intervene?
Terada-Hagiwara  (2005)  and Edwards  (2007)  remind  of  the  Inconsistent  Trinity, 
which  has  been  the  basis  of  open  economy macroeconomics  since  the  1980s 
including developed countries' monetary policies. It proclaims the impossibility for a 
country to maintain a fixed exchange rate, to permit free capital flows, and to have an 
independent  monetary  policy  directed  towards  domestic  objectives.  Since  open 
economies  cannot  restrain  cross-border  capital  flows,  governments  are  not 
simultaneously able to control exchange rates and to use monetary policy to target 
other  domestic  goals.  Hence,  Inconsistent  Trinity is  a  declaration  against  pegged 
rates and exchange rate targeting is not anymore as visible part in central banks' tool 
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box as it was in the previous decades. However, especially developing countries are 
still  balancing between the  goals  by having independent  monetary policy,  highly 
managed exchange rate, and some degrees of capital control. In fact, after the Asian 
Financial  Crisis  1997-1998  many  Asian  countries  have  been  controlling  their 
exchange  rates  even  harder  than  before.  So  far,  they  are  coping  well  but  it  is 
interesting to see what will happen in the future because capital flows are difficult to 
restrain.
While there are different approaches, all central banks intervene the foreign exchange 
market to a certain degree and none of the currencies are wholly floating. Many say 
that the exchange rate is the most important individual price of the economy. It is the 
only  number  whose  fluctuation  instantly  affects  on  the  economy's  wealth, 
competitiveness, and growth potential. Thus, many economists would like to fix their 
currency to some degree what has been exceptional during last decades' prevailing 
neoliberal  economic atmosphere.  There are still  countries,  which have fixed their 
currency value to some other currency, traditionally mostly to the U.S. dollar. The 
number of countries that use dollar peg, has actually been decreasing as more and 
more developing countries have started to use basket of currencies.  (Pekkarinen & 
Sutela 2002: 274-275.) For instance, China does not let its currency to flow free in 
the market but instead uses a basket including all major currencies, which together 
determine its currency value. Many argue that the Chinese yuan is kept undervalued 
as part of its export-led growth strategy, which has been boosted further since 2002. 
Especially the United States that is suffering from large trade deficit with China, has 
been criticizing China to let its currency to appreciate more. (European Central Bank 
2006: 15.) This is probably what will slowly happen as China wants to boost also its  
domestic consumption.
Actually the debate, whether exchange rates are correctly priced, is very important as 
exchange rates affect the prices of all assets in the economy and the competitiveness 
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of firms. Especially firms, which trade internationally, are affected since the success 
of exports and imports rely on the exchange rate. Appreciation/(depreciation) makes 
exports  more  expensive/(cheaper)  and  imports  cheaper/(more  expensive).  Hence, 
export-oriented firms benefit from currency depreciation since their products become 
cheaper in foreign currencies and thus more competitive. Appreciation would have 
the  opposite  effect  making  exports  more  difficult.  Only  firms,  whose  products' 
demand curve is  very inelastic,  would be able  to  pass-through the exchange rate 
changes  to  their  product  prices.  Import-oriented  firms,  on  the  other  hand,  prefer 
appreciation  of  their  domestic  currency  because  then  imports  become  cheaper 
enhancing  their  profit  margins.  Depreciation  is  undesired  as  it  would  make  the 
imports more expensive and thus harm their competitiveness. Big multinational firms 
are  less  subject  to  be  affected  by  exchange  rate  changes  because  their  business 
operations are well diversified across the globe offsetting currency changes. Other 
firms should hedge against exchange rate changes. (Pritamani et al. 2002.)
It is no wonder that central banks want to influence their currency value to be more 
favorable  for  the economy as  a  whole.  Central  banks follow their  exchange rate 
closely and are ready to interrupt if it gets too far away from the optimal level. For 
example, in August 2011 the Swiss National Bank told that its currency is overvalued 
harming country's exports and tourism. The central bank announced the target level 
of 1.20 franc against euro under which it will not let its currency to appreciate no 
matter what. So far, the level has survived well, i.e. the central bank has succeeded to 
maintain it and the market has believed it. If the franc continues to stay close to the 
1.20 level, it can become the most popular carry trade funding currency with its zero 
interest rate because the risk of appreciation seems to be absent. Whether and how 
long this  continues  remains  to  be seen.  Certainly,  it  is  difficult  and takes  lots  of 
money to prevent currency appreciation if the demand for country's assets is as high 
as it has been during the euro crisis.
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In addition to changing interest rates and domestic money supply, central banks can 
impact exchange rates directly by engaging in currency trading, where they either use 
their foreign exchange reserves (currently China and Japan together hold around 40% 
of  the  total  world  foreign  exchange  reserves)  or  print  more  money.  In  order  to 
depreciate/(appreciate) the domestic currency, the central bank can buy/(sell) foreign 
currency to make it appreciate/(depreciate) against the domestic currency. (Mishkin 
2006: 461.)  This is  exactly what China and many other export-oriented countries 
have been doing in order to prevent appreciation of their currencies; with their huge 
trade surpluses they have bought foreign currencies and especially financed current 
account  deficit  of  the  U.S.,  who overspends  (European Central  Bank  2006:  34). 
Large changes in currency values (devaluations/revaluations) are rarely preferred as 
they  affect  the  dynamism  of  the  whole  economy  triggering  severe  economic 
consequences. For example, if domestic currency depreciates, foreign debt becomes 
more expensive. Depreciation of the domestic currency typically increases inflation 
as well. Rapid appreciation, on the other hand, can lead to over-borrowing in foreign 
currency that can be very risky. If something unexpected occurs, e.g. the exchange 
rate reverses and the domestic currency starts to depreciate, it will be increasingly 
difficult to pay the borrowed money back. (Brause 2011: 24-26.)
Besides actual interventions, central banks can influence exchange rates by signaling. 
Brause (2011: 29-30, 49-51) argues that usually central  banks do not report  their 
interventions in public because they have lots of daily operations and they do not 
want  to  generate  any  rumours  to  make  the  market  turbulent.  Signaling  future 
monetary policy changes  (e.g.  changes in  interest  rates)  is,  however,  one way to 
influence inflation and exchange rates as investors change their expectations about 
future fundamental factors through these signals. In order to keep their credibility 
also in the future, central banks of course need to act according to what they have 
signaled. It is important to highlight that central banks do not always achieve their 
objectives because of the strength of the market forces. If the market does not believe 
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that  central  bank can  keep the  exchange rate  where  it  has  promised,  speculative 
attacks  may  and  probably  will  test  this  money  making  opportunity.  There  are 
multiple examples, e.g. Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998, where central banks failed 
to maintain control  over  their  currency values due to speculative attacks.  (Zhang 
2001.)
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4 INITIAL RESULTS OF CARRY TRADE PROFITABILITY
4.1 Data, portfolio construction, and comparable results of other academics
I obtained the data of daily spot exchange rates and money market rates of G10 
currencies  (Australian  dollar,  Canadian  dollar,  euro,  Japanese  yen,  New Zealand 
dollar, Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, Swiss franc, UK pound, and U.S. dollar) 
from Datastream. The time period is from 1997/01/01 to 2012/01/31. The carry trade 
strategy is that every month three lowest interest rate currencies are sold and three 
highest  interest  rate  currencies  bought.  Monthly  updating  does  not  dramatically 
increase the transaction costs because the weights are rather stable.  The portfolio 
needed to be balanced altogether 33 times (one of the target currencies changed 19 
times and one of the funding currencies 14 times), which is not much compared to 
the  length  of  the  evaluation  period.  Therefore,  one  does  not  need  to  consider 
transaction costs,  which anyway are much lower for currencies than for equities. 
Japanese yen and Swiss franc belonged all the time to the funding currencies while 
the  third  one  varied.  None  of  the  target  currencies  were  permanent  but  varied 
between Australian dollar, New Zealand dollar, pound, Norwegian krone, and U.S. 
dollar.
The research design follows closely Christiansen et al. (2010) except that their time 
period was 1995-2008 and they updated their  portfolio quarterly.  They document 
4.6% annual excess returns for the carry trade strategy. Ilmanen (2011: 273-274) uses 
also G10 currencies in 1983-2009. Instead of equal weights, three highest and three 
lowest interest rate currencies obtain weights of 50%, 30%, and 20%, respectively. 
With  this  dynamic  strategy  Ilmanen  succeeds  to  improve  carry  trade  returns 
significantly. The portfolio with weekly updating yields 6.1% annual excess returns 
with  Sharpe  ratio  of  0.61.  On  average,  the  dynamic  portfolio  earns  roughly  the 
interest  rate  difference.  Burnside  et  al.  (2011)  study  the  behaviour  of  20  major 
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currencies in 1976-2010 and find that equally weighted carry trade portfolio of 20 
currencies has an average annual excess return of 4.6% with a standard deviation of 
5.1%. In comparison, average excess return of the U.S. stock market over the same 
period is 6.5% with a standard deviation of 15.7%. The first glance is that stocks in 
general yield more than carry trade but at the same time the returns are more volatile. 
Higher yield is then a compensation for greater risk. However, since the burst of the 
Internet  Bubble in 2000 carry trade has  actually outperformed most  of  the stock 
markets.
4.2 Results
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for portfolio's expected exchange rate change 
(i.e. the interest rate difference) and actual change. As it is possible to see, exchange 
rates  have  varied  much more  than  predicted  by UIP.  Also  the  sign  of  the  mean 
change is different to UIP, i.e. target currencies on average have appreciated against 
the funding currencies.
Table 2. Summary statistics for annualized expected and actual exchange rate changes (%).
Min Max Mean Median Std dev
Expected change -4.17 -1.23 -2.83 -2.98 0.04
Actual change -104.17 4.14*108 1.20 7.10 10.24
When running standard UIP regression based on the equation (7), daily interest rate 
difference seems to have explanatory power over exchange rate change, see Table 3. 
Since our dependent variable is not serially correlated, OLS parameter and standard 
error estimates should be unbiased (Petersen 2009).
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Table 3. OLS regression for actual exchange rate change.
Independent 
variable
Alpha t-value of alpha Beta t-value of beta R²
Daily UIP 0.0014 (2.63) 11.6287 (2.59) 0.0017
Even though the results are statistically significant, Figure 1 suggests that there is no 
strong linear relationship between the variables. Actual exchange rate changes vary 
much more than predicted by UIP and to both directions.  Later I show that it  is  
possible to improve the model further by allowing nonlinear relationship between 
UIP and exchange rate changes.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the portfolio returns. Since carry trade is a 
zero-investment strategy, mean excess return is the same than average return, which 
is 4% per year. Median excess return is impressive 10%. In addition to pure returns, 
there are two different risk-adjusted performance measures in which one should look 
at if want to compare different strategies with each other. They are Sharpe ratio and 
Sortino  ratio.  As  normal  distribution  assumption  does  not  model  perfectly  the 
investment  risk  of  carry trade,  we should  also  have  a  tail  risk  measure  because 
Figure 1. Crossplot of actual and expected exchange rate changes.
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Sharpe  ratio  alone  would  be  misleading.  Sortino  ratio  takes  into  account  that 
volatility  can  be  asymmetric  and  return  distribution  skewed  by  dividing  the 
distribution into two halfs: downside below the mean and upside above the mean. 
For both halfs we can calculate volatility. Of course price variation leading to upside 
returns is preferable. Sortino ratio is excess return per unit of downside volatility. So, 
it is otherwise similar to Sharpe ratio expect that only downside volatility is used 
instead of total volatility.
Table 4. Summary statistics for annualized portfolio excess returns (%).
Min -100.00
Max 4.14*108
Mean 4.03
Median 10.08
Std dev 10.24
Skewness (t-value) -0.55 (-14.12)
Excess kurtosis (t-value) 9.77 (125.10)
Sharpe 0.39
Sortino 0.47
Traditionally carry trade returns have been documented to have significant negative 
skewness  and  excess  kurtosis,  which  does  not  disappear  even  with  diversifying 
across multiple  currency pairs.  This is  also the case with my portfolio.  Negative 
skewness  and  excess  kurtosis  indicate  that  carry  trade  returns  are  vulnerable  to 
greater crashes, i.e. there is a high probability for a small gain and a small probability 
for a very large loss. The loss indeed materialized. The Global Financial Crisis and 
especially the latter part of the year 2008 made the target currencies to depreciate 
strongly,  see  Figure  2.  This  caused  heavy  losses  for  carry  trade  investors  and 
therefore the cumulative returns of carry trade, during my research period of 1997-
2012, are not so impressive (below 50%).
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Figure 2. Cumulative returns of the carry trade portfolio.
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5 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
5.1 Risk-aversion
The question really is about what explains the described pattern of carry trade returns 
and the  obvious  failure  of  UIP?  One prominent  explanation  points  finger  to  the 
assumption of investors' risk-neutrality, which is the core of UIP but clearly does not 
hold in reality. Financial theory presumes investors' risk-aversion. In this paper risk-
aversion reflects investor sentiment with regard to risk and risky investments. Thus, 
it is a time-varying variable. Risk-aversion increases the price of risk, i.e. investor 
will hold risky assets (e.g. riskier bonds) only if they are able to earn higher premium 
(higher  interest  rate)  compared  to  less  risky  assets.  Changes  in  risk-aversion 
contribute  to  sharp  movements  in  asset  prices.  When  risk-aversion  decreases, 
investors feel  they can afford to take more risk,  and when it  increases,  investors 
collectively move to safer assets. (Coudert & Gex 2006.) Thus, even higher interest 
rates are a sign of a larger risk, they are tempting and at times of low risk-aversion 
can  attract  more  incoming investments  making the  target  currency to  appreciate. 
When risk-aversion rises, the flow of incoming investments may turn quickly into 
outgoing flood lowering significantly the demand for domestic bonds and currency. 
This makes interest rates to rise further and currency value to depreciate. In turn, 
demand for safe-haven countries' bonds and currencies increase causing their prices 
to rise and interest rates to decline further. Hence, carry trade contains a large risk of 
target  currencies'  devaluation  that  seems  to  materialize  when  risk-aversion  rises. 
Coudert and Gex (2006) confirm the intuition that risk-aversion tends to increase 
before  financial  crises.  By  doing  so  it  magnifies  the  actual  crises  as  money 
disappears from risky investments. Still, many of the crises have been caused by low 
risk-aversion  and  excessive  risk  taking  that  has  lead  to  bubbles  in  the  financial 
markets.
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How to  measure  the  level  of  risk-aversion?  Clearly,  risk-aversion  is  not  directly 
observable but there are several different risk-aversion indicators each with their own 
pros and cons.  The level of interest rates describes quite well  the risk perception 
towards individual countries. However, there is no global interest rate, which could 
tell the exact level of aggregate risk-aversion. Furthermore, interest rates may get up 
also  when investors  feel  less  risk-averse  and  move  their  investments  from bond 
markets to stock markets. Investors may also demand higher interest rates when other 
asset classes are giving good returns and again this has nothing to do with increasing 
risk-aversion.  Therefore,  we should look for  other  indicators  that  are  specifically 
designed to measure the changing risk-aversion among investors.
VIX, which stands for  Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, 
tells  the implied volatility on S&P 500 index options,  see Figure 3.  It  represents 
market's expectations on stock market volatility over the next 30 days. VIX is quoted 
in percentage points and it is annualized. For instance, if the VIX is 30, which is 
relatively high, expected annualized change in S&P 500 index is 30% over the next 
30 days. Hence, investors expect the S&P 500 to move up or down 30%/√12=8.66% 
over the next 30-day period.  Because volatility can lead to upside movements as 
well, a sharp improvement in macroeconomic conditions could lead to high value of 
VIX and at the same time enormous boost in the equity market making investors less 
risk-averse. Thus, it is not a perfect risk-aversion indicator. Moreover, as it is related 
to equity market, it may not be the best indicator for currency market. Nevertheless it 
is widely used to measure global risk aversion, and if we believe risk-aversion to be 
universal phenomenon across financial markets, VIX works well enough.
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TED and credit spreads are also good measures of risk-aversion and not as equity 
market  concentrated  as  VIX.  TED  spread  (see  Figure  4)  is  calculated  as  the 
difference between 3-month LIBOR interbanking market interest rate and 3-month T-
Bill rate. Hence, it indicates willingness of banks to provide funding in the interbank 
market and is an excellent proxy for tightening global liquidity. When risk-aversion 
is high and banks do not trust each other, TED spread widens indicating that there is 
no liquidity at the market. This is extremely serious for riskier strategies like carry 
trade because the liquidity disappears mostly from riskier assets causing their prices 
to  decline.  Credit  spread (see Figure 5),  which usually is  calculated as the yield 
difference  between  risky corporate  bonds  and  safer  government  bonds,  works  in 
similar way. When risk-aversion rises, credit spread widens due to increased selling 
of  high  risk  bonds  and increased  buying of  safe-haven bonds.  Thus,  rising  risk-
aversion leads to flight to quality phenomenon and widening TED and credit spreads.
Figure 3. The daily VIX.
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5.2 Safe-haven phenomenon
Unlike other securities, currencies do not have absolute values but instead relative 
values to other currencies, i.e. exchange rate is a comparison of two currencies. All 
currencies  cannot  simultaneously  appreciate  or  depreciate  because  appreciating 
currencies have always depreciating counterparts and vice versa. Therefore, in every 
market  condition  there  are  appreciating  currencies,  which  can  be  exploited.  This 
Figure 5. The daily credit spread.
Figure 4. The daily TED spread.
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confirms that currencies should not be treated as one similar investment category 
because their risk-exposure clearly varies depending on the current market situation. 
During turbulent times namely U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc are usually 
viewed as safer investments.  Hence,  the money inflows make them to appreciate 
against the currencies that suffer from money outflows. The pattern is revisited when 
risk-aversion is lower, which is the more common state of nature. Because of this 
safe-haven currencies earn on average a lower risk premium than other currencies 
(Christiansen  et  al.  2010).  Even if  their  interest  rates  were  low,  the  tendency to 
appreciate during market turmoil makes them very risky funding currencies for carry 
trade.  During  my research  period  the  yen  and the  franc  have  been  continuously 
funding currencies, i.e. their interest rates were among the three lowest. The interest 
rates of the U.S. have varied more and the dollar has belonged also to the group of 
target currencies. A target currency behaving like a safe-haven would be ideal for 
carry trade since it would reduce the overall risk if there was no fear of devaluation 
during market turbulence.
Nowadays,  there  are  no  safe-havens in  the  sense  that  they would  be completely 
isolated from global financial storms. Still, some countries' assets are viewed as safe. 
Why is that? There are both rational and psychological reasons for the safe-haven 
phenomenon.  Clearly, a safe-haven country should be perceived as low-risk.  Low 
interest rates are common for safe-haven countries but do not automatically give the 
safe-haven status since low interest rates may indicate low economic growth or even 
deflation (e.g. Japan). Furthermore, during the past decades the U.S. has possessed 
high interest rates from time to time and still it has been perceived as safe. Habib and 
Stracca (2011) study 52 currencies in 1986-2009 and find some common features for 
safe-haven currencies. Size and liquidity of a country's financial markets is important 
in order to prevent liquidity from drying up during crises. Equally important is the 
net foreign asset position,  which is  value of the assets  that  country owns abroad 
minus the value of the domestic assets owned by foreigners. In addition, the public 
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debt  to  GDP ratio  as  well  as  development  and liquidity of  the  foreign  exchange 
market (measured by the bid-ask spread) are associated to safe-haven status. None of 
the features alone explain well  the exchange rate behaviour so it  is  all  about the 
overall picture. Moreover, safe-haven currencies are not the force of nature but they 
can vary depending on the health of the country. So far, dollar, yen, and franc are all 
highly liquid currencies and the economies of U.S. and Japan among the strongest of 
all. Smaller Switzerland, in turn, has benefited from the good reputation of Swiss 
banking sector and currency's explicit gold backing.
There are also psychological factors maintaining the safe-haven phenomenon and 
hence it could be classified as a market anomaly. For example, the dollar was viewed 
as a safe-haven currency during some critical periods of the Global Financial Crisis 
in 2008, even though the crisis started from the U.S. and it was obvious that the U.S. 
will suffer large economic damage. Also safe-haven label seems to be more dominant 
than money supply, e.g. during the autumn 2011 the dollar appreciated against most 
other currencies due to safe-haven status although the U.S. printed huge amount of 
money  to  boost  its  economic  growth.  So,  no  matter  of  the  domestic  economic 
conditions, safe-haven currencies do appreciate more than the fundamentals predict 
because  of  the  herding  of  investors.  Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that  market 
psychology explains  at  least  partly  the  existence  of  safe-haven  currencies  in  the 
foreign exchange market.
5.3 From risk-aversion to asset pricing
Risk-aversion leads to the principle that excess returns can be only due to greater 
risk. This  seems to fit  also to the case of our own, i.e.  carry trade returns are a 
compensation for bearing risks. The pattern of steady small returns during normal 
times and a large loss during market turbulence can be described as a tail-risk or 
selling put options/catastrophe insurances proposed by Cochrane (1999):  “Most of 
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the time they earn a small premium. Once in a great while they lose a lot, and they 
lose a lot in times of financial catastrophe, when most investors are really anxious 
that the value of their investments not evaporate.” Cochrane's  idea, which is now a 
central principle of modern asset-pricing theory, starts from the presumption that on 
average investors are risk-averse and therefore most investors prefer securities that 
do well in recessions. Thus, securities that perform badly need to pay a risk premium 
during good times in order to attract investors. In turn, for safe-haven assets investors 
accept lower long-term returns because they provide a hedge when it is needed, i.e. 
they  work  as  catastrophe  insurances.  This  may  explain  why  high  interest  rate 
currencies  usually  do  not  depreciate  and  sometimes  even  appreciate  against  low 
interest  rate  currencies  in  normal  times.  Like  2008  showed,  target  currencies 
obviously  hold  risks  related  to  financial  distress,  which  materialized  when  risk-
aversion  increased  and  investors  abandoned  their  risky  assets  (flight-to-quality). 
Hence, target currencies on average provide risk premium in normal times. From this 
perspective carry trade can be thought of as a trading strategy that aspires to exploit 
the risk premium. Then, forward premium puzzle is not really a puzzle since the 
documented carry trade returns are only due to bearing time-varying risks.
Next  I  review  the  concept  of  stochastic  discount  factor  (SDF),  which  Cochrane 
(2005) has introduced to describe how assets are valued. SDF can be thought of as a 
function  of  investors'  marginal  utilities.  Hence,  SDF is  time-varying and obtains 
high/(low)  values  in  states  where  marginal  utility  is  high/(low).  On  average, 
investors'  marginal  utility  is  highest/(lowest)  during  turbulence/(boom)  when 
nothing/(everything) seems sure, i.e. risk-aversion and marginal utility walk hand in 
hand. It means that the same payoff provides more marginal utility during recession 
(when risk aversion is high) than in good times. This is the reason why counter-
cyclical  safe-haven  currencies  are  more  desired  than  other  currencies:  they  have 
positive covariance with SDF. For asset valuation purpose it would mean that they 
must be more expensive and therefore offer lower average returns. Because most of 
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the time we can draw an equal sign between safe-haven currencies and carry trade 
funding currencies, this indeed explains why UIP hypothesis fails. Its presumptions 
are in stark contrast with the principles of SDF since UIP would assume low interest-
rate  currencies  to yield higher returns (appreciate).  In reality the higher expected 
returns (i.e. risk premium) is associated with pro-cyclical target currencies, which 
have  negative  covariance  with  SDF.  Again  these  are  averages  and because  SDF 
varies over time, neither risk premium nor asset prices are constant but can vary 
significantly.
5.4 Predictability – can returns be predicted?
It is a different story whether exchange rates can be predicted. If yes, the question is 
how far or rather how close? Modern financial theory accepts that asset prices are to 
some extent  predictable.  This  holds  particularly in  long-term but  not  so much in 
short-term.  To understand this  we need to  first  understand that  predictability has 
much to do with changes in risk-aversion. For example, during a long boom period 
target/(funding) currencies may have appreciated/(depreciated) strongly and become 
overvalued/(undervalued) due to low risk-aversion level. If risk-aversion suddenly 
changes,  the  mispricings  become  visible  to  all  market  participants  and  can  be 
corrected quickly. Like stated earlier, high prices of target currencies and low prices 
of funding currencies can also be tracked macroeconomically. Hence, it is important 
to demonstrate also the mean-reversing pattern that clearly exists behind long-run 
exchange rate movements although it does not show in our daily frequency data. If 
we  can  consider  also  the  risk  aspect,  i.e.  time-varying  SDF,  exchange  rate 
movements become more predictable also in shorter-term.
5.4.1 Long-run predictability, i.e. mean-reversion once more
The question is what causes the push back to equilibrium. Surely, it has much to do 
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with the  change in  investors'  risk-aversion.  After  all,  there  is  clear  evidence  that 
target currencies tend to appreciate when risk-aversion is low and depreciate when 
risk-aversion  rises  rapidly.  Another  plausible  explanation  highlighting  mean-
reversing behaviour may be equally true but maybe not as dominant as risk-aversion. 
Equilibrium theories assume that exchange rates are too important for the economy 
as a whole and therefore they should not be thought only as an asset. Macroeconomic 
fundamentals drive long-term mean-reversion and then there are also central banks, 
whose  importance  has  not  disappeared,  remember  e.g.  Switzerland 2011.  Central 
bank definitely wants to  act  if  country's  currency value is  too far away from its 
optimal level no matter of the phase of the business cycle  or risk-aversion level.  
Hence, exchange rates cannot wander infinitely to one direction. This needs to be 
taken  into  account  especially  if  modelling  long  horizon  carry  trade  because  on 
average  large  devaluations  of  target  currencies  happen only after  they have  first 
become  overvalued.  This  can  be  thought  of  as  a  process  where  exchange  rates 
wander slowly away from their fundamental equilibrium values but reverse quickly 
back when turbulence hits the market. It would be more than interesting to cross-
check this  finding in a longer time frame to see whether  the mean-reversion can 
happen  also  slowly  and  during  low  risk-aversion,  which  would  undermine  the 
hypothesis of recession risk premium.
Furthermore, there are still lots of observations where high interest rate currencies 
appreciate  even  equilibrium  models  show  considerable  overvaluations.  Thus, 
apparently the changes in risk-aversion resulting into the transition from risky assets 
to  safe-haven  assets  and  vice  versa,  indeed,  are  the  leading  factor  driving  the 
currency values. Next we could ask what causes the changes in risk-aversion? This 
can get us back to macroeconomic conditions because obviously something has got 
too wrong from investors' perspective to change their view towards risk and why 
investors are less willing to hold risk. Thus, there is not one without the other, i.e. 
risk  perspective  and  macroeconomic  equilibrium  approaches  are  closely  related. 
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Changes in risk-aversion can be thought of as a trigger. When risk-aversion is low, 
investors still know that the exchange rate may be misvalued but they feel that they 
can  afford  to  take  the  risk  of  potential  large  devaluation.  When  risk-aversion 
increases  due  to  some  reason,  exchange  rate  can  move  very  fast  back  to  its 
equilibrium.
Deriving a fundamental equilibrium state for a portfolio is not easy task to do. For 
this  purpose  I  formed  cumulative  UIP  condition,  which  forecasts  the  current 
exchange rate level if UIP had hold all the time since the obversation period began. 
The problem with forward exchange rates is that they are calculated every time with 
the current spot rate and interest rate difference, i.e. they do not take into account that 
the  spot  rates  can  be  temporarily  mispriced.  Cumulative  UIP tries  to  provide  a 
solution to this problem. Figure 6 shows that during expansions, which are generally 
characterized by low risk-aversion, high interest rate currencies become overvalued 
and low interest rate currencies undervalued. These mispricings get much smaller as 
a result of the turbulence induced mean-reversion of 2008 giving some credit to long-
term equilibrium theories.
Figure 6. Cumulative actual change (A) and cumulative UIP (U).
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Still  the cumulative UIP does not work too well reinforcing our intuition that UIP 
may not be the optimal equilibrium condition for long horizon. OLS regression (see 
Table 5) verifies that deviations from cumulative UIP cannot explain daily variation 
in exchange rates.
Table 5. OLS regression for actual exchange rate change.
Independent 
variable
Alpha t-value of alpha Beta t-value of beta R²
Cumulative UIP -0.0003 (-0.43) 0.0005 (0.49) 0.0001
Now  we  come  to  the  question  what  is  the  time  horizon  where  returns  can  be 
predicted. It is well  known that macroeconomic predictability (mean-reversion) is 
long-term phenomenon. Because SDF (risk-aversion and marginal utility) does not 
change much in short frequencies, neither it can explain much of the daily variation 
in returns (more though than mean-reversion).  Instead SDF does change  over the 
business  cycle  indicating  that  predictability  is  connected  to  phase  of  the  cycle. 
Moreover,  Bekaert et al. (2007) argue that the reason for more accurate long-term 
predictability  comes  from  more  visible  macroeconomic  fundamentals.  In  short 
horizon fundamentals do not necessarily appear as much as in long-term because 
noise may dominate the exchange rate behaviour. In long-run random noise cancels 
itself out at least to some degree and fundamentals can therefore show up better.
5.4.2 Shorter-run predictability
A number of studies emphasize monthly horizon as the shortest time period, where 
returns show glimpses of statistical  predictability.  Shorter time periods have been 
said to follow random walk. Actually for proofing carry trade profitability this would 
be good news as random walk without a drift would mean that UIP condition is not  
fulfilled. After all, UIP assumes a very clear exchange rate behaviour, i.e. predictable 
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change towards the UIP condition. Of course that predictability is very different from 
the risk-aversion induced predictability of our theoretical background.
There are some strong aspects supporting also shorter-term predictability. Technical 
analysis particularly is so widely used even for intraday trading that it undermines 
the  random  walk  hypothesis.  Technical  analysis  means  forecasting  future  price 
movements through the study of past market data, primarily price and volume. In the 
1990s it was used either as a primary or secondary source of trading information by 
over 90% of foreign exchange traders in London (Allen and Taylor 1992) and Hong 
Kong  (Lui  and  Mole  1998).  Many  argue  that  its  importance,  at  least,  has  not 
decreased since the 1990s. Why would it be used if not for enhancing profits? Hence, 
it might be that short-term predictability exists but it has been just difficult to capture 
in statistically significant way. After all, long horizons result mechanically from short 
horizons.  Predictability  is  also  a  statistical  feature  as  regression  coefficient  for 
explanatory variable and model's R2 rise with the horizon when explanatory variable 
is persistent. As interest rate differential is highly persistent, this explains why UIP 
works statistically better at longer horizons.
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6 RISK PROFILE OF CARRY TRADE
Even though traditional asset pricing models (e.g. CAPM and Fama & French three 
factor model) have some explanatory power over stocks, Burnside et al. (2011) do 
not  find  any  proofs  that  carry  trade  excess  returns  are  compensation  for 
conventionally measured risk.  Advocates of market efficiency argue that observed 
carry trade excess returns simply provide evidence of an yet unidentified risk factor. 
Since Fama (1984) there has been continuous debate about existence of some kind of 
time-varying risk premium and even today much of the foreign exchange research is 
directed to get more comprehensive understanding of this risk premium. In center of 
the research are such factors as country-specific risks, systematic risk arising from 
other  financial  markets,  (il)liquidity,  peso  problems,  currency  speculation,  and 
central bank behaviour.
6.1 Country-specific risks
For short-term carry trade (like our strategy) the main source of risk is exchange rate 
movements whereas longer-term risk has multiple faces. It seems that the overall risk 
premium of carry trade is higher in long-run because both interest rate and exchange 
rate  movements  can  be  larger.  Imagine  you  have  calculated  a  forward  foreign 
exchange rate for ten years from now using current interest rates of 10-year maturity 
bonds. During this time the term structure can change substantially and the interest 
rates that were used for determining the forward exchange rate may get completely 
different.  Higher  interest  rate  risk  can  be  seen  from  the  upward  sloping  term 
structures that are a norm with very few exceptions. Obviously,  investors require 
higher risk premium to hold long-term bonds than short-term bonds. Where does the 
risk premium for long-term bonds come from, i.e. what could result in big capital 
losses  to  require  higher  interest  rate?  Veronesi  (2010:  642,  644)  says  that 
expectations  on  future  inflation  is  one  obvious  explanation.  Even  risk-free 
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government bonds are not completely risk-free. They may be credit risk-free (not 
always) but not inflation risk-free the only exception being inflation linked bonds. If 
inflation is expected to rise, central banks act accordingly and rise interest rates. Also 
investors demand higher nominal interest rates to offset the expected higher inflation. 
Then,  bond  prices  decline,  and  even  investor  holds  the  bond  until  its  maturity, 
inflation eats at least some of the profit. Hence, the longer the investment period, the 
greater the effect of inflation.
Inflation is a risk for carry trade also due to its direct influence on exchange rates. If 
PPP held,  high  inflation  should  be  accompanied  by  currency  depreciation.  The 
possibility of large devaluation of high interest rate currencies is the greatest risk for 
carry trade. Ilmanen (2011: 355) reminds that currency depreciation may not happen 
if the central bank is credible and inflation is expected to be in control. But if the 
inflation continues to be too high, currency depreciation is going to happen sooner or 
later because large PPP violations are not sustainable in long-term. Like always in 
macroeconomics  neither  the  relationship  between  inflation  and  devaluation  is  so 
straightforward as there are also other factors affecting exchange rates. Devaluations 
can  occur  after  a  period  of  low  inflation  as  well,  what  happened  in  the  Asian 
Financial Crisis 1997-1998. In addition to market reactions, also central banks can 
execute devaluations. The announcement of  Swiss central bank in 2011 shows that 
even central bank originated devaluation risk has not disappeared completely for G10 
currencies. Thus,  carry  trade  speculates  not  only  against  UIP and  PPP but  also 
against all other potential devaluation risks. Furthermore, the relationship between 
inflation  and  exchange  rates  works  two-way.  Depreciating  currency  increases 
inflation by making imports more expensive and exports cheaper, ceteris paribus. So, 
inflation increases both directly due to higher prices of imports and indirectly due to 
increased demand for exports resulting in higher prices of exports and money inflows 
to the country. This is of course other way around for appreciating currency.
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Longer  investment  horizon has  also  higher  credit  risk and liquidity risk.  If  there 
appears a real risk of default due to economic difficulties, investors will abandon 
those bonds causing their interest rates to sky rocket and currency value to decline. 
Default is not the only outcome to be afraid of because also downgrading affects both 
bond prices and exchange rate. Downgrading is a real worry if investors plan to sell 
their  bonds  before  the  maturity.  Credit  rating  agencies  hold  key  role  in  the 
relationship between downgrade risk and interest rate. Liquidity has enormous effect 
on  carry  trade  profits  and  will  be  discussed  later  with  more  details  from  the 
perspective of risk-aversion. For now it is enough to know that different risk-free 
assets can have very different levels of liquidity. Especially small countries' bonds 
may  not  have  much  liquidity  in  the  secondary  market.  Thus,  in  order  to  avoid 
liquidity risk investor should hold the bond until its maturity but that in turn may 
expose the investor to higher inflation and default risks.
All of these above mentioned risks are more or less country-specific, i.e. devaluation, 
inflation, credit, and liquidity risks are rarely same between low and high interest rate 
countries. This is interesting since most financial theories claim that idiosyncratic 
risk should not be compensated by excess returns and only systematic risk factors 
matter. For example, Cochrane (1999) says that any risk factor, which can result in a 
risk premium, must affect large group of investors as their collective actions drive 
asset prices. Still, we clearly cannot ignore the described country-specific risks. This 
is particularly the case because carry trade has only limited number of currencies to 
choose  from.  When  constructing  a  carry  trade  portfolio,  the  impact  of  country-
specific risks can be reduced but never completely eliminated.  Moreover, it seems 
that they fit Cochrane's classification better than for instance company-specific risks 
simply because countries are bigger in size and have a larger effect on the global 
economy.  Country-specific  risks also match with Cochrane's  (2005) more current 
definition  of  systematic  risk  factors,  whose  main  idea  is  the  co-variation  with 
stochastic discount factor.
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6.2 Another look at interest rate risk
Now we could ask whether short-term carry trade is less risky since there is not so 
much inflation, credit, and liquidity risks. If the answer is yes,  should it mean that 
long-term carry trade yields  on average  higher  returns?  This  immediately rises  a 
question whether it is really true that UIP holds better at long-term? Again it would 
be interesting to examine also long-term carry trade returns. Bekaert et al.  (2007) 
examine UIP at both short and long horizons by conducting a vector autoregression. 
The data include U.S., UK, German, and Japanese exchange rates and zero-coupon 
bond yields with maturities of 3, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months in 1972-1996. Their  
results show that exchange rate deviations from UIP are mainly currency dependent, 
not so much horizon dependent. In other words, for some currencies UIP holds both 
at short and long horizons whereas for some other currencies UIP does not hold in 
any horizon. This affirms that either the exposure to systematic risk factors must vary 
across countries  or  country-specific  risk factors  have something to  do with carry 
trade risk premium. Sometimes UIP deviations can be larger at longer horizons. This 
is inconsistent with many of the previous research, which claim UIP to correct itself 
eventually. However, it is not in contrast with my finding that cumulative UIP is not 
a good predictor of future exchange rates even though in long-run there exists some 
mean-reversion.
Chaboud and Wright (2005) have a distinctive approach. They study the exchange 
rates of dollar, yen, deutschemark/euro, franc, and pound in 1988-2002. The data is 
in 5-minute intervals, which makes it possible to focus on the precise periods, where 
interest accrues to the open carry trade positions. A position, which is not kept open 
overnight,  does not receive interest  differential  because intraday interest  rates are 
zero, i.e. interest does not accrue continuously but on discrete daily intervals. The 
authors want to examine whether exchange rates jump over those time periods when 
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interest actually accrue to offset the interest differential, i.e. does UIP hold or is there 
arbitrage opportunities. The idea is similar to arbitrage considerations in stock prices 
on ex-dividend date. Overall, UIP works well. The best fit is with the dollar-pound 
currency pair, where the slope coefficient in the UIP regression is close to one. So, if  
exchange rates bounce back to UIP condition when interest accrues (for most bonds 
this is at daily frequency), one could think that the deviations cannot get very far 
from the equilibrium state. The authors admit that the results do not apply every time 
and there is lots of noise. We also have to notice that tiny deviations, which may not 
be statistically significant,  can grow into larger deviations as time passes by.  For 
future  pondering,  it  would  be  great  to  find  out  if  there  is  a  difference,  which 
maturities predict future spot foreign exchange rates better than others, and why?
No matter whether UIP condition is fulfilled or not, interest rates do move exchange 
rates. Interest rate changes are a risk for carry trade also because the interest rate 
differential  is  always the starting point  for  the strategy.  The difference,  however, 
varies over time and across different maturities. For our strategy, only the former 
matters because we are merely trading the assets of same maturity. Although we do 
not need to care about the latter, I will first point out some problematic questions of 
changing term spreads as they show how unrealistic it is to assume perfect fit of UIP 
in all  circumstances.  So,  what  happens when the  interest  rate  difference  changes 
across maturities? On average, short-term interest rate difference is more stable than 
long-term rate difference. The reason is that since the long-end of the yield curve 
cannot be influenced so much by central  banks (if they do not take part in bond 
purchases), long-term interest rate difference can have more variation reacting faster 
to changes in investor behaviour and macroeconomic expectations.  Yield curve can 
move  up  and  down as  a  whole  (level  change)  as  well  as  change  its  slope  and 
curvature. Since forward foreign exchange rates for some future time are calculated 
by using corresponding maturities of current interest rates, the short-end of the term 
structure (e.g. 3-month rate) determines the short-term forward rates and the long-
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end  (e.g.  10-year  rate)  determines  the  long-term  forward  rates. Can  there  be  a 
situation where  interest  rate  differences  of  1  month and 1 year  maturities  are  in 
conflict with each other indicating opposing exchange rate movements? In principle 
these  cases  are  possible  but  not  common and we do not  have  to  pay too  much 
attention to these. Still, this highlights that UIP is not so straightforward and there 
probably cannot be cases where UIP could work in every time horizon.
For the question, what happens when the difference changes inside the one and only 
maturity,  we  have  also  empirical  evidence.  A rule  of  thumb  is  that  when  the 
difference  increases/(decreases),  the  target/(funding)  currency  becomes  more 
attractive for investors causing it to appreciate. This is especially the case when the 
aggregate risk-aversion level is low, which is the more normal situation. Like Figure 
7 shows, during my research period the portfolio interest rate difference was at its  
highest level prior to the Global Financial Crisis.
This was due to increase in investors' risk-aversion (see Figures 3, 4, and 5) that lead 
to flight-to-quality, i.e. abandonment of higher risk bonds making their interest rates 
to rise further and safe-haven countries' interest rates to decline. Large interest rate 
Figure 7. Daily interest rate difference between portfolio's target and funding currencies.
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differentials are common feature for times of substantial crash risk (Brunnermeier et 
al. 2008).
Lustig et al. (2011) question the importance of varying interest rate differentials by 
claiming that more important factor in changes of carry trade returns is exchange rate 
movements  because  in  market  turmoil  target  currencies  depreciate  and  funding 
currencies appreciate,  not because of their  interest  rates significantly mean-revert. 
Anyhow,  the  previous  figure  showed  that  the  crisis  lead  not  only  to  the  mean-
reversion of exchange rates but also to the mean-reversion of interest rates as the 
interest  rate  difference  narrowed significantly after  the crisis  had become global. 
Never before during the research period had interest rate difference been so narrow. 
This was due to the necessity of high interest rate countries to lower their target rates 
in order to boost economic growth. Still, in the beginning of 2012 the difference was 
historically very narrow, which may have influence on the carry trade returns that 
have not risen significantly from the end of 2009 (see Figure 2).
For instance, Ilmanen (2011: 274) argues that on average with carry trade what you 
see is what you get, i.e. carry trade earns roughly the interest rate difference, no more 
or  less. He (ibid:  420)  goes  even  further  by  calling  interest  rate  difference  the 
expected return and exchange rate change the unexpected return, i.e. the former is the 
expected return investor is on average expected to get. Surely, this does not happen 
always because this expected risk premium is only due to the fact that holding a 
higher interest rate currency is riskier and unexpected return can lead to major loss. 
Anyway, because the difference has been smaller as a result of the global downturn, 
this may explain the smaller returns. It will be interesting to see what happens when 
the interest rate difference one day increases to a more typical situation. Will there be 
a return back to the golden times prior 2008 or is the success story of carry trade 
finally over?  Something has changed already. As a result  of the Global Financial 
Crisis investors have started to pay more attention to expected growth differentials 
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between countries and structural factors, such as current account positions. Countries 
with  high  economic  growth  expectations,  i.e.  emerging  markets,  have  seen  their 
currencies appreciating. In the future, carry trade investors could go even more after 
developing countries'  currencies,  which  typically  have  much higher  interest  rates 
than G10 countries.  Surely,  inflation and devaluation risks  as  well  as transaction 
costs are higher for emerging currencies but the profit possibilities are tempting.
Equally important compared to the current interest rates are the expectations of the 
future interest rates and the story behind them. Rising/(declining) interest rates mean 
declining/(rising) bond prices. So, if the interest rate is expected to rise in the near 
future,  investors  may delay bond  purchasing.  Moreover,  if  risk-aversion  is  high, 
investors  may  back  down  completely.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  interest  rate  is 
expected to decline, bond investment currently is attractive. The same is true with 
currency values.  If  a  currency is  expected  to  depreciate/(appreciate),  the  foreign 
investments to the country may decrease/(increase). (Pekkarinen & Sutela 2002: 144-
145.)
6.3 Systematic risk arising from other financial markets
Lustig et  al.  (2011) study behaviour of 35 currencies in 1983-2009 with monthly 
investment  horizon  and  find  large  co-movement  (either  positive  or  negative)  in 
exchange  rate  changes  that  gives  at  least  a  partial  explanation  to  the  forward 
premium puzzle. Earlier also Brunnermeier et al. (2008) have documented excess co-
movement  among  currencies  with  similar  interest  rates.  Lustig  et  al.  claim  that 
similar  pattern in  exchange rate  changes  indicates  the existence of some kind of 
common risk factor. The authors continue that because country-specific risk factors 
(e.g.  hyperinflation  and  default  risk)  can  be  neutralized  by  diversification,  only 
common or global risk can compensate investors with excess returns. Exposure to the 
common  risk  factor  increases  monotonically  from negative  for  low  interest  rate 
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currencies to positive for high interest rate currencies.  The common factor seem to 
have much to do with changes in global equity market volatility as currencies with 
higher  interest  rates  tend  to  depreciate/(appreciate)  against  currencies  with  lower 
interest  rates  when volatility is  high/(low).  Like mentioned earlier,  carry trade  is 
usually conducted by investing in a few currency pairs meaning that country-specific 
risk  does  not  disappear  completely.  Thus,  even  though  the  global  equity  market 
turbulence surely has impact on carry trade returns, the authors' inference may lead 
to wrong conclusion because they do not consider other than global factors for the 
risk premium.
Menkhoff et al.  (2012) investigate behaviour of 48 currencies in 1983-2009. Also 
they argue that excess returns of carry trade are a compensation for time-varying 
systematic risk, which is related to equity market volatility. High/(low) interest rate 
currencies yield higher returns when volatility is low/(high). The relation is more 
profound in the sample of developed countries but almost the same in the full sample 
of 48 currencies. The time-varying volatility risk also explains relatively well returns 
of equity and bond markets that should not be surprising, if all of them are correlated. 
General level of volatility is related to economic cycles being low in bull markets 
and  high  in  bear  markets.  Moreover,  from my  perspective  volatility  is  a  direct 
consequence  of  risk-aversion  and  flight-to-quality  is  the  reason  behind  the  co-
movement of all risky assets during turbulence.
Koijen  and  Vrugt  (2011)  find  that  carry  trade  is  correlated  positively  only  with 
commodities whereas the correlation with equities and bonds is negative. In practice, 
strong  commodity  price  linkage  is  important  determinant  to  currency  value 
especially  for  big  commodity  producers,  e.g.  Australia,  Brazil,  Canada,  New 
Zealand, and Russia.  When connected to business cycles,  the results  suggest that 
carry trade and commodity risk premiums are pro-cyclical whereas equity and bond 
risk premiums are on average counter-cyclical. This is not surprising as  often the 
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currencies of the commodity producers suffer during global recessions when demand 
for  the  commodities  declines  and  their  prices  correspondingly.  (Bank  for 
International Settlements 2008.)
Baillie and Chang (2011) study carry trade for nine different currencies in 1978-1998 
and find that UIP is more likely to hold when volatility is abnormally high and there 
is a large differential between the interest rates of the preferred funding currency and 
the  second  lowest  funding  currency.  All  else  equal,  profit-maximizing  investors 
would prefer to fund carry trades with the lowest cost currency and invest in the 
highest  yielding  currency.  The  lower  the  interest  rate  of  the  preferred  funding 
currency relative to alternative funding currencies, the more attractive it is to fund 
carry trade with this particular currency. This is surprising because the intuition is 
that  the  preferred  funding  currency  should  depreciate  further  due  to  heavy 
borrowing, i.e. just the opposite to the finding of Baillie and Chang. The explanation 
is  that  wide  interest  rate  difference  between  the  preferred  and  other  funding 
currencies is typical for market turbulence. We already know that abnormally high 
volatility is associated with a rise in investors' risk-aversion that is when UIP holds 
better. The authors succeed to discover also other peculiarities. UIP holds more likely 
when Swiss franc is not the preferred funding currency. In turn, UIP is more likely to 
fail when carry trade is conducted by using the yen as a funding currency and the 
dollar as a target currency, i.e. the dollar does not depreciate against the yen at least 
as much as predicted by the interest rate difference.
6.4 Liquidity risk
Many argue that  carry trade excess returns  are  a  premium for liquidity risk.  For 
instance, Brunnermeier et al. (2008) suggest liquidity to be the key driver in negative 
skewness  of  carry  trade  returns  because  rapid  decrease  in  liquidity  can  lead  to 
currency crashes. Menkhoff et al. (2012) argue too that stronger price movements 
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(volatility) indicate lower liquidity. It is hard to see the volatility and liquidity effects 
independently from each other because they are so closely related and neither of 
them can  be  observed  directly.  The  authors  do  not  rule  out  an  explanation  that 
volatility is ”just a summary measure of various dimensions of liquidity, which are 
not captured by liquidity proxies”. Typically liquidity risk stems from the uncertainty 
at what price investors are able to close their open positions when the market starts to 
go to wrong direction. In stock markets illiquidity and risk are strongly related but 
the foreign exchange market is said to be the most liquid because of its enormous 
turnover.  Indeed,  major  countries’ currencies  as  well  as  their  bonds  have  much 
liquidity on the individual level. Moreover, Perraudin and Vitale (1996: 89) find that 
decentralized  markets,  such  as  the  foreign  exchange  market,  are  less  subject  to 
crashes than are centralized markets because liquidity does not disappear as rapidly. 
The  Global  Financial  Crisis  undermined  this  notion  although  it did  not  lead  to 
widening of bid-ask spreads for major currencies. Instead carry trade investors were 
hit  especially  due  to  problems in  assuring  funding liquidity.  The investors faced 
increased funding constraints when banks become more concerned about their own 
access  to  capital  markets  and demanded higher  margins.  Like wider  TED spread 
indicated, money did not circulate well between banks and from banks to customers 
intensifying (il)liquidity spirals. (IMF 2008.)
The foreign exchange market differs from stock markets in the wide use of leverage 
to enhance profit margins. Leverage magnifies the liquidity risk because liquidity can 
disappear very quickly when risk-aversion rises and investors want/need to cover 
their open positions. Then, there may not be enough buyers in the market that can 
cause  more  panic  and  lead  to  even  larger  price  drops.  (Bank  for  International 
Settlements 2008). What happens in the time of market turmoil, is that investors want 
to get rid of their  risky carry trade positions.  This leads to abandonment of long 
positions because highly leveraged short positions need to be paid back. Thus, target 
currencies experience heavy money outflows and funding currencies inflows causing 
56
them to depreciate and appreciate, respectively. In normal circumstances, carry trade 
involves huge amount of capital. The estimates vary somewhere between $1 trillion 
and $6 trillion. If the money starts to move to some direction, it has an enormous 
effect on exchange rates and the overall global economy, as we will learn next.
The most popular funding currency has been the yen as Japan has tried to tackle the 
deflation that the country has been experiencing for over a decade by zero interest 
rates. In normal times, this lead to depreciation of yen and appreciation of target 
currencies. In the beginning of 2007 the yen carry trade was estimated to be worth $1 
trillion. The Global Financial Crisis reversed the pattern. Investors panicked and sold 
their investments of higher interest rate currencies pushing their values down. The 
money flowed to the opposite direction leading to appreciation of yen. During a few 
months time starting in July 2008 yen appreciated dozens of percents against high 
interest  rate  currencies.  When  the  most  popular  funding currency appreciated  so 
much, it is not surprising that unhedged carry trade strategies made big losses in 
2008. Even Japan was hurt from the appreciation of its currency as its economy is 
highly dependent on exports. (Vistesen 2009.)
Lowenstein (2000: 42) argues that using leverage is extremely risky and investors 
actually give up control of their other investments as well. The securities may seem 
unrelated but they are not if  they are owned by the same investor.  When market 
turbulence  hits  to  some of  the  investments  and  especially  if  they are  leveraged, 
investor may be forced to sell what he can instead of what he should. Hence, risk in 
ensuring funding liquidity is critical for carry trade as lack of it can lead to forced 
fire  sales  in illiquid market.  This  connection is  interesting and may explain why 
different asset classes are heavily correlated during market turmoil. Thus, carry trade 
risk premium may indeed arise from other financial  markets even the connection 
does not seem present during good times.
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6.4.1 Algorithmic trading
The rise of algorithmic trading is contributing to the overall carry trade risk if it is 
leading  to  reduction  in  liquidity  during  turbulence.  Algorithms  are  computer 
programs  that  use  both  past  and  real-time  data  to  detect  profitable  trading 
opportunities. Hence,  they  can  speed  up  price  discovery  and  improve  market 
efficiency that is embraced by many scholars. Use of algorithmic trading started in 
the U.S. equity market  in the 1990s.  In the foreign exchange market  algorithmic 
trading has grown extremely rapidly since 2005 and today it is an important part of  
currency trading. Chaboud et al. (2009) study, what effects algorithmic trading has in 
the interdealer market. Their data consists of three most traded currency pairs: euro-
dollar, dollar-yen, and euro-yen in 2006-2007. In the interdealer market majority of 
transactions  nowadays  involve  at  least  one  algorithmic  counterparty.  Increasingly 
often machines are trading with each other. Their effect on exchange rates depends 
on how the algorithms are designed and programmed to act under different market 
conditions.  If  algorithms  are  programmed  similarly,  their  trading  strategies  are 
correlated that may cause problems in the form of taking same side of the market 
resulting in exaggeration of market movements. The authors, indeed, find that trades 
conducted  by  machines  are  more  correlated  than  human  trades.  Since  many 
algorithms are programmed to avoid volatile times, they may also decrease liquidity 
during turbulent times. This is a real concern also from the perspective of carry trade.
When comparing human trades and algorithmic trades further, the authors find that 
human trades are more essential for price discovery for euro-dollar and yen-dollar 
currency pairs, whereas algorithmic trades are dominant for euro-yen exchange rate. 
There seems to be a logical explanation for this. Human traders are the informed 
ones  since  beforehand  programmed algorithms  can  never  be  as  up-to-date  about 
fundamentals as capable humans. That is why, they are leading the price discovery 
process in the two largest currency pairs. The price discovery for the third exchange 
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rate, euro-yen, happens more or less by the cross-rates of euro-dollar and yen-dollar. 
If euro-yen exchange rate is briefly out of the line, machines simply are faster than 
humans  in  exploiting  this  arbitrage  opportunity  emerged  by  cross-rate  price 
formation.
6.5 Peso problems
Negative skewness and excess kurtosis indicate that the risk profile of carry trade 
seems to result from rare but extreme crashes. Jurek (2009) investigates the existence 
of this so-called crash risk premium by using option data on foreign exchange rates 
in 1999-2008. He forms crash-neutral carry trade portfolios, in which exposure to 
rapid devaluations of the high interest rate currencies has been hedged. If the crash 
risk premium explains the carry trade returns, the hedged portfolio should not earn 
any excess returns. However, results show that hedging decreases the returns by 15-
35% but does not cancel them out completely. In other words, carry trade strategies  
continue to deliver excess returns. When Adaptive Markets Hypothesis is discussed, 
we will notice that the overly cheap hedging may have been due to the fact that the 
market did not recognize the obvious arbitrage opportunity by the combination of 
carry trade and appropriate options. Today the situation must be wholly different. 
Anyway,  although  the  crash  risk  is  obviously  contributing  to  carry  trade  risk 
premium, the existence of serious peso problem is questioned because carry trade 
strategies restarted to be profitable already in 2009, and the 2008 losses were actually 
relatively small compared to the cumulative returns from the past decades (for my 
shorter research period the 2008 losses were remarkable).
6.6 Speculation and trading itself
6.6.1 Speculation
59
Unlike stock speculation, which is widely accepted practice, currency speculation is 
blamed causing problems to national economies. It has been approximated from 70% 
to 90% of foreign exchange trading to be speculative, i.e. the investor has no plan to 
actually make the currency delivery but rather just speculates on the movement of 
that particular currency. Carlson and Osler (2000) find that high levels of speculative 
activity increase volatility. Furthermore, because of the noise trader risk, which refers 
to the possibility that mispricings can get worse in short-term due to trading of noise 
traders,  trend chasing  and bubble boosting  can be rational  strategies.  Trends and 
eventual reversions create excess volatility, which causes extra costs to producers and 
consumers.  However,  for  speculators  high  variability  of  returns  can  offer  profit-
making opportunities.
Osler (2000) points out that most research do not capture the essence of currency 
trading if their data is not sufficiently high-frequency. For example, minute-to-minute 
trading  is  common  for  algorithms.  Also  the  usage  of  stop-loss  methods  makes 
investment  horizons  shorter  as  most  of  investors  do  not  sit  and  wait  that  their 
investments would bounce back. 80% of foreign exchange positions are held for less 
than one week and 40% are held for less than two days. Osler (2003) finds stop-loss 
usage  in  almost  every  currency  trading  position.  Extensive  use  of  leverage  can 
explain why stop-loss methods are so popular. When trend goes over certain limit to 
wrong direction from an investor's point of view, stop-loss quickly closes the risky 
leveraged position in order to minimize losses. Price trend, thus, extends further in 
short-term leading also to increased volatility.
Jylhä and Suominen (2011) study currency speculation of hedge funds by using data 
of 11 currencies in 1979-2008. The authors find carry trade returns to be correlated 
with the returns from various hedge fund indexes. What can explain this? First of all,  
hedge funds certainly engage in carry trade and because of their size, their actions 
can affect exchange rates. For example, in the autumn of 2008 there were significant 
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money outflows from hedge funds,  which  then  had to  abandon their  carry trade 
positions contributing to the depreciation of the high interest rate currencies. Still, the 
authors suggest that the index returns must be more affected by systematic factors 
also common to carry trade than pure carry trade investments.
6.6.2 Trading itself
Plantin and Shin (2006) point out that carry trade reinforces the violation of UIP as 
investors take short positions in low interest rate currencies preventing them from 
appreciating  and  long  positions  in  high  interest  rate  currencies  helping  them  to 
appreciate further. Excess returns of carry trade, thus, become self-fulfilling at least 
in short-term. Surely, this cannot continue forever since it leads to overvaluation of 
the  target  currency and undervaluation  of  the  funding  currency.  Another  popular 
trading  strategy,  which  strengthens  short-run  misvaluations,  is  momentum.  In 
momentum strategies investors take long positions in currencies with positive past 
returns and short positions in currencies with negative returns.  Baillie and Chang 
(2011) say that if momentum traders respond to past price movements instead of 
expectations  about  fundamentals,  the  trend  will  be  reinforced and moves  further 
away from its equilibrium.
Osler (2000) and Jongen et al. (2006) agree that use of technical analysis reinforces 
trends. Their idea is similar to Goodhart's (1988), who argued that exchange rate 
changes  might  be  determined  by  current  balance  of  technical  analysts  and 
fundamentalists. Jongen et al. find that as exchange rate moves further away from its 
fundamental value, fundamentalists get driven out of the market. Technical analysis 
remains active and continues to push the exchange rate trend further. In some point, 
the bubble will burst and the valuation is reversed by investor and/or central bank 
activity. When  the  exchange rate  is  moving back to  its  fundamental  value,  both 
fundamentalists and technical analysts agree on the direction of the rate and remain 
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active since both strategies are profitable. This speeds up the price push back to its 
fundamentals and thus the value corrections (reversals) can happen fast. In practice, 
fundamentalists and technical analysts should not be seen only as opposite forces 
since most traders use both indicators in their decision-making.
Although carry trade and momentum are independent strategies, they are also linked 
to  each  other.  Carry  trade  funding/(target)  currencies  that  are  heavily  borrowed/
(invested in), seem to depreciate/(appreciate) over time and thus have short/(long) 
position  in  momentum  portfolios.  Thus,  carry  trade  and  momentum  strategies 
together  can  amplify  exchange  rate  movements  and  violate  UIP more  than  they 
would do individually. (Baillie & Chang 2011.)  Even the two strategies have some 
similarities,  Burnside et al. (2007) find that the momentum and carry trade returns 
are generally uncorrelated and therefore diversifying across both strategies reduces 
overall risk. Momentum trading is more diverse than carry trade because for trend 
chasing strategies it does not matter if the exchange rates are moving up or down as 
long as they are moving to some direction.
6.7 Central bank activity
Clearly central bank interventions, which can lead to large correction in exchange 
rates, are a risk for carry trade and may explain a part of the gained excess returns. 
Central  banks sometimes push exchange rates and are sometimes pulled into the 
market, depending on the current market situation and their goals. Sager and Taylor 
(2006)  see  that  central  banks  are  increasingly  using  small  part  of  their  foreign 
exchange reserves to wealth creation (e.g. by currency derivatives) particularly in 
Asia. On the other hand, Neely and Weller (2011) find that central bank interventions 
are rather responses to strong trends that exist in the market. In other words, central 
banks are pulled into the market because their currency values run too far away from 
their target ratios. Mark and Moh (2007) study dollar-deutschemark and dollar-yen 
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currency pairs  in  1976-1998  and,  indeed,  find  that  the  forward  premium puzzle 
intensifies during times when central banks intervene. For the dollar-yen pair, the 
puzzle  is  present  at  all  times  but  is  much  stronger  during  interventions.  For  the 
dollar-deutschemark pair, the puzzle exists only during times of intervention. So, if 
you happen to own a manual for central bank policies, their interventions and hence 
UIP deviations should not come as surprises but they could be exploited.
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7 BEHAVIORALIST CHALLENGE TO MARKET EFFICIENCY – ARE 
EXCESS RETURNS ANOMALIES?
7.1 Behavioral biases
As risk-based explanations falter to give a complete answer for the carry trade excess 
returns,  attention  is  now  turned  to  behavioral  finance  and  market  frictions. 
Behavioral finance assumes market participants to be subject of various cognitive 
biases documented in the psychology literature that impact their trading decisions. 
Common starting point to all of these biases is the acceptance of investors' bounded 
rationality or irrationality that hinder the diffusion of fundamentals into asset prices. 
Thus, it  may be possible to identify profitable trading strategies, like carry trade. 
Neely and Weller (2011) say that exchange rates  clearly reflect mass psychology 
moving from confidence, optimism, and greed to pessimism, fear, and panic. These 
can explain  the described pattern of carry trade returns: an initial underreaction to 
UIP  (non-depreciation  of  target  currencies)  and  a  delayed  overreaction  (quick 
appreciation of funding currencies). Even though the usage of stop-loss strategies 
and algorithms takes some burden away from human decision-making, we cannot 
completely deny the impact of  psychological biases on exchange rates. Indeed it is 
market psychology behind the aggregate risk-aversion levels.
One of the most often quoted behavioral bias among investors is overconfidence. 
Oberlechner and Osler (2009) conducted a survey among North American foreign 
exchange  dealers  and  found  a  vast  majority  of  them to  overestimate  their  own 
abilities  (“better-than-average-effect”)  and  private  information  (“miscalibration”), 
and  underestimate  risks  and  uncertainty.  Burnside  et  al.  (2010)  say  that 
overconfidence  indeed  can  offer  an  explanation  to  the  forward  premium puzzle. 
Overconfident  investors  overreact  to  their  signals  about  future  inflation  causing 
overreaction to  the interest  rates.  This  happens especially to  the interest  rates  of 
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target  currencies,  whose  inflation  risk  is  usually  higher.  Then  the  interest  rate 
differential  is  larger  than  it  should  be under  perfectly rational  world  making the 
forward exchange rate mispriced compared to the spot rate. The idea that forward 
exchange rate could be misvalued is interesting and has not been considered much in 
the literature. It could explain why spot exchange rate does not react fully to forward 
rate. Overconfidence, like any other psychological attribute, is time-varying being 
lowest on times of market turbulence. Thus, UIP seems to hold better/(worse) when 
investors are less/(more) overconfident.
7.2 Microstructure of the foreign exchange market
Among behavioral finance there is strong school that says more emphasis should be 
put into the research of microstructure of the foreign exchange market. Instead of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the microstructure literature concentrates on smaller 
market  frictions  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  that  affect  decision-making  of 
investors  and  thus  exchange  rates.  Especially  the  importance  of  transmission  of 
information  among  market  participants  and  the  resulting  heterogeneity  in  their 
expectations  and  behaviour  is  highlighted.  (Sarno  &  Taylor  2001.)  Different 
expectations stem from information asymmetries. Investors are different and possess 
different  amount  of  information,  e.g.  some  have  private  information.  Moreover, 
information  can  be  difficult  to  interpret  and  all  market  participants  do  not  have 
enough resources and/or skills to learn the complicated relationships of the economy. 
Investors also attach different weights on public information, which is based on their 
past  experience  and success  in  forecasting  exchange rate  changes  as  well  as  the 
forecasting  technique  they  use.  Thus,  investors  can  interpret  even  the  same 
information very differently. That is why new fundamental information diffuses only 
slowly to exchange rates. (Jongen et al. 2006.)
Froot and Thaler (1990: 188-190) argue that for UIP failure it is enough that some of 
the investors are slow in responding to changes in interest rate differential. These 
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investors may need time to think about trades before executing them, or they simply 
cannot  respond  quickly  to  recent  information.  Push  to  equilibrium state  may be 
hindered further if rational investors try to exploit other group's slower movements. 
In  practice,  interest  rate  differential  is  quite  stable  undermining this  explanation. 
Neither  there  is  any  evidence  that  UIP fails  only  when  interest  rate  differential 
changes. Jongen et al. (2006) use survey forecasts for the major three exchange rates 
along several forecast horizons in 1989-2004. There can be identified distinct periods 
of high and low dispersion, where market participants disagree how the exchange 
rate  will  change.  The  dispersion  of  expectations  is  positively  related  to  forecast 
horizon, i.e. dispersion increases when forecast horizon gets longer and vice versa. 
Hence, investors seem to disagree more on what will happen in long-term than in 
short-term. Earlier the same result was found also by Sarno and Taylor (2001). This 
is interesting as exchange rates are said to bounce back to their fundamentals in long-
term (e.g.  Meredith & Chinn 1998). Perhaps,  fundamentals  are not at  all  easy to 
interpret.
Also Sager and Taylor (2006) say that more emphasis should be put to understand the 
different  customer  types  and  their  distinct  trading  motives.  Macroeconomic 
equilibrium models fail to offer accurate exchange rate forecasts because they do not 
consider these market frictions. The authors divide market participants along how 
active/passive  and  informed/uninformed  they  are.  Active  traders  are  clearly 
motivated by profit-making opportunities or they have other bright goals, which they 
want to target, e.g. central banks. Passive traders' foreign exchange exposure comes 
from other sources than currency speculation, e.g. from international trade. Passive 
investors  either  leave  their  exposure  unhedged  or  they  hedge  it  without  much 
consideration about the future direction of exchange rate movements.
Informed/uninformed  investors  can  be  divided  along  how  relevant  information 
(either  public  or  private  or  both)  they possess.  Central  banks have  the  best  data 
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available that is relevant to their own currency. Thus, central banks and all the market 
participants, which get first hand information about central bank interventions and 
changes  in  the  foreign  exchange  reserves,  are  among  the  informed  ones.  Also 
financial firms, whose core business is to follow the currency market, can be said to 
be  informed.  Furthermore, order  flow (net  demand  =  demand  -  supply)  is  very 
important  source  of  private  information  that  only  few  market  participants  have. 
Current order flow cannot be easily estimated because dealers keep their customers' 
orders strictly confidential, e.g. order flow information used by research is only got 
much later. Since large dealers see more customer orders, they are potentially better 
informed  than  smaller  dealers.  Typically  large  dealers  that  have  access  to  the 
information of order flow and overcrowded carry trade positions, participate in swing 
trading, which means selling a currency when it is overbought and buying a currency 
when it is oversold.
Order flow is a powerful determinant of exchange rate changes particularly because 
it  allows  the  wider  market  to  learn  about  the  private  information  and  trading 
strategies  of  better  informed  traders.  It  has,  however,  been  unclear  how  the 
information in order flow gets into the exchange rate. Osler et al. (2011) illustrate 
this  process  by  showing  how  asymmetric  information  affects  exchange  rate 
discovery. Everything starts from the facts that foreign exchange trading takes place 
in the two-tier market and not all market participants share the same information. 
Dealers know their customers by type and trade size. Thus, it is possible for them to 
identify  on  average,  which  customers  are  informed  and  which  uninformed.  The 
interdealer market is, in turn, anonymous and large trades are commonly split into 
smaller  trades.  Hence,  interdealer  trading  by  itself  is  less  likely  to  carry  much 
information. The authors find that after trading with informed customers, such as 
financial firms, dealers place similar orders in the interdealer market. As a result, 
exchange rate moves within the interdealer market to the direction dictated by the 
increased trading. This new currency value is then used by dealers in their quotations 
67
to  customers.  Thus,  new  information,  which  informed  customers  brought  to  the 
market, is not reflected into the dealers quotations immediately but only after a round 
in the interdealer market. Sometimes it may take even few days until the order flow 
information  is  revealed  to  the  whole  market.  On  the  other  hand,  trading  with 
uninformed  customers,  such  as  commercial  firms,  does  not  trigger  extraordinary 
trading activity or move considerably exchange rates in the interdealer market.
Akram et  al.  (2008)  study high  frequency data  of  dollar-euro,  dollar-pound,  and 
dollar-yen currency pairs and find numerous brief deviations from the law of one 
price,  which  enable  excess  returns  even  after  transaction  costs.  These  arbitrage 
opportunities  have  gone  undetected  by  earlier  research  because  sufficient  short-
interval data has not been available. The authors say that the decentralization of the 
foreign  exchange  market  is  an  important  reason  for  the  arbitrage  opportunities. 
Information gathering is difficult because the quotations of numerous dealers are not 
easily observable. Hence, transactions may and do occur at the same time at different 
prices.  Frequency,  duration,  and  size  of  the  arbitrage  opportunities,  however, 
disappear rapidly indicating that the foreign exchange market works quite efficiently 
after all.
7.3 Adaptive Markets Hypothesis
Lo (2004) proposes a new perspective called Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) 
that  tries  to  reconcile  the  opposing  views  of  market  efficiency  and  behavioral 
finance.  Lo hopes AMH to be taken as an improved version of Efficient  Market 
Hypothesis (EMH), just being more realistic version of it by also taking into account 
the behavioral biases affecting the decision-making of market participants. Basically, 
market  participants  are  heterogeneous  and  boundedly  rational.  When  new 
information arrives, not all of the participants can act perfectly rationally because 
learning is difficult, costly, and takes time. Therefore, the forces that drive prices to 
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their fundamental levels are weaker and operate over longer periods than what EMH 
predicts.  Prices  will  eventually get  back to  their  fundamental  values  because  the 
competition  will  cancel  out  any  excess  profit  opportunity.  Prices  reflect  at  any 
current point as much information as dictated by the combination of environmental 
conditions and the nature of market participants.  Thus, according to AMH, profit 
opportunities will generally exist in financial markets, but the forces of learning and 
competition will  gradually make these opportunities  to  disappear.  However,  there 
will  appear  new profit-making  opportunities,  which  will  then  go through  similar 
cycle  of  learning  and  competition.  Because  learning  takes  time,  more  complex 
trading strategies will last longer (be profitable longer) than simple ones.
The idea of  AMH is supported by Schwert  (2002),  who found that  certain well-
known stock market anomalies (the size effect, the value effect, the weekend effect, 
and  the  dividend  yield  effect)  have  weakened  or  disappeared  after  they  were 
published  in  the  academic  literature.  Immediately  after  the  anomalies  became 
common knowledge traders started to exploit them by adopting investment vehicles 
that  implemented  the  profitable  strategies.  Gradually  the  named  anomalies  were 
either weakened or arbitraged away. This could happen also to carry trade and other 
strategies that exploit the recession risk premium. Something has happened already. 
Ilmanen (2011: 287) points out that earlier the tail risk of carry trade returns was 
much  cheaper  to  eliminate  via  options  compared  to  the  similar  risks  in  equity 
markets. This is not the case anymore as traders have learnt to exploit the predictable 
patterns.
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8 MODELLING CARRY TRADE RETURNS
8.1 Background for modelling
Both UIP and PPP are normative approaches, i.e. hypotheses how exchange rates 
should behave. My approach is positive that means I aim to describe how the world 
really works in practice. Obviously UIP and PPP have their weaknesses and we can 
call them oversimplifications that put all their eggs in one basket. UIP claims interest 
rate difference to be the sole source of exchange rate movements while PPP stresses 
differing  price  levels.  Apparently variation  in  exchange  rates could  be  better 
explained by multiple  factors  although picking up the  right  factors  is  more  than 
difficult to do.  The correlation to different risk factors is seldom stable but instead 
can  vary significantly through time depending on the  current  state.  Furthermore, 
individual  factors  may seem to  have  explanatory power  purely because  they are 
correlated with other factors (maybe even unidentified factors).
Surely,  there  are  several  macroeconomic  factors  driving  the  time-variance  of  the 
carry trade returns, just to name a few e.g. inflation, GDP growth, or any other factor  
that can lead to large devaluation of the target currency. The problem is that models 
built on the macroeconomic factors have not succeeded to capture the dynamics of 
the exchange rates very well at least in short-term. The problem might be due to the 
nature  of  the  models  commonly  used  because macroeconomic  fundamentals  are 
difficult to measure exactly and put into indicators (the joint-hypothesis problem). 
Nonlinear relationships cannot be pictured satisfactorily with linear, one regime OLS 
regression models.  Hence, the explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables 
may show only when modelled with the appropriate method (e.g. Korhonen 2005). 
Later we will also learn from market frictions literature that fundamentals are not 
interpreted  homogeneously  among  investors.  Furthermore,  commonly 
macroeconomic data is not high frequency enough and it seems that the effects of 
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macroeconomic fundamentals  are  incorporating into exchange rates  too slowly to 
provide a  meaningful explanation for short-term exchange rate  changes.  Accurate 
macroeconomic data is published with lags and sometimes even revisited later. For a 
successful trading strategy we need variables,  which both work and are available 
now. If we do not have lagged values at our disposal, we are not able to exploit the  
information.  Ideally  we  would  prefer  all  our  model's  exogenous  variables  to  be 
lagged values because if we succeed to find predictability, we are one step closer to a 
money-making machine (in this paper money-making means that on average odds 
are on your side).
Another problem is that most macroeconomic time series often contain unit roots. 
With  time series  variables  we have  to  be  careful  since  apparent  and statistically 
significant causal relationship could exist only due to common external factors or 
just  coincident  (spurious  regression).  For  instance,  exchange  rates  of  similar 
countries are frequently cointegrated, i.e. they share a common stochastic trend (co-
movement)  that  is  caused  by  a  common  external  factor,  e.g.  economic  state. 
(Cowpertwait & Metcalfe 2009: 211-217.) Hence, it is important to have a plausible 
theory behind that can verify the results. Our case is a little bit simpler because we 
use carry trade returns and differencing removed persistence, i.e.  consecutive data 
points in the return time series are not correlated with each other.  Moreover, even 
though macroeconomic factors can be very complex, they are merely just pure data 
failing to take enough into account the psychological side of the financial markets. 
My aim is to fill this gap by considering various risk-aversion indicators and whether 
they can predict exchange rate movements more precisely.
8.2 Model
In order to model the carry trade returns and risks, I use Logistic Smooth Transition 
Regression  (LSTR)  -model,  which  allows  a  nonlinear  relationship  between 
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explanatory variables and exchange rate change (in contrast UIP is a linear model). 
LSTR1-model makes it possible to describe processes whose dynamics (i.e. mean 
and variance) is different between two regimes, e.g. expansions and recessions. Thus, 
due  to  time-varying  risk  premium,  carry  trade  returns  can  be  related  to  distinct 
regimes (normal times and market turbulence). The exact transition period is often 
difficult  to  measure or  forecast  but  STR helps  to  model  the  period by assuming 
regime transition to be a continuous process depending on the transition variable. 
The smooth (time-taking) transition between regimes seems to fit well for the foreign 
exchange  market,  which  is  characterized  by  heterogeneous  participants  like 
investors,  speculators,  traders,  central  banks,  and  tourists.  Some  of  them  have 
motives that are something else than profit  making, e.g.  multinational firms may 
want to hedge their foreign exchange exposure. Thus, they can be referred as noise or 
liquidity traders, who need to buy or sell currencies while conducting international 
trade, no matter of the level of exchange rates. Also motives of central banks differ 
from the rational profit making assumption, which is the core of market efficiency 
based asset pricing models. The advantage of using STR-model is that it does not 
assume perfectly rational investors but accepts investors heterogeneity. Taken all this 
together, it is unlikely that all the market participants would change their currency 
trading at the same time and manner. Clearly, a smooth transition from one regime to 
another is more realistic.
The STR-modelling cycle consists  of specification,  estimation,  and evaluation.  In 
specification phase we test our linear base model (UIP) against STR-model. First, we 
need to choose potential transition variables and then perform F-test to see whether 
the  linear  relationship  between  independent  and  dependent  variable  could  be 
modelled more accurately by allowing a smooth regime change depending on one of 
the transition variables. If the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected by one or more 
transition variables, STR-model will be an improvement to the linear base model. 
Then,  it  would  mean  that  the  carry  trade  returns  are  not  regime-independent 
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suggested by linear UIP framework but they react asymmetrically to interest  rate 
differentials depending on the different regimes. For a transition variable we will 
choose the variable, which has the strongest rejection of linearity (lowest p-value). In 
estimation phase the STR-model parameters are estimated. The statistical software 
that I utilize, JMulTi, uses conditional maximum likelihood, which is more suitable 
than OLS for estimating nonlinearly behaving parameters.  Then, alternative models 
can  be  compared  by information  criteria  (JMulTi  exploits  Akaike,  Schwarz,  and 
Hannan-Quinn criteria). Last, model fitness can also be measured by R2, which is the 
proportion of variance explained by the selected risk factors.  In the last phase the 
model is evaluated by misspecification tests.
STR-model is presented in equation (9).
Δ S t→T= x t
' φ+( x t
' θ)∗G (γ , c ; zt)+ε t→T (9)
where φ (linear part of the model) and θ (nonlinear part) are the parameter vectors, xt 
is the vector of explanatory variables (exogenous variables (STR) or lags of 
endogenous variable (STAR)), and ε is the independent and identically distributed 
error term. G is a monotonously increasing function of the transition variable zt and 
bounded between 0 and 1, see equation (10).
G(γ , c ; zt)=
1
1+e−γ( zt−c) (10)
G determines the degree of reversion towards the UIP condition. Slope parameter γ 
indicates how rapidly the transition of G from 0 to 1 takes place. Slope parameter γ  
should be standardized, i.e. made scale-free by dividing it by the standard deviation 
of the transition variable. (Teräsvirta 2004.) With high gamma values (measured in 
hundreds  or  thousands)  STR-model  is  more  difficult  to  estimate  because  it 
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approaches a switching regression model. A moderate value of gamma, e.g. γ = 1, 
imposes a slow transition whereas γ = 10 indicates already a rapid change between 
the regimes. Coefficient c represents the point of transition between the two extreme 
regimes.
8.3 Different STR-models
Because  our  theoretical  background  assumes  two  regimes,  STR-model  with  one 
location parameter c is enough. This is the so called LSTR1 model. If we wanted to 
highlight the mean-reversing behaviour of the exchange rates, i.e. if we had a longer-
term data frequency, we could define a different transition function: either LSTR2 
(second  order  logistic  function)  or  ESTR  (exponential  function).  Both  of  them 
assume three regimes, where the inner regime represents the equilibrium state and 
two  symmetrical  outer  regimes  the  deviations  from the  equilibrium.  Clearly,  the 
exchange rate behaviour is different between the inner and outer regimes due to the 
dynamics  of  mean-reversion,  i.e.  the  larger  the  deviation,  the  faster  the  mean-
reversion. The main difference between LSTR2 and ESTR is that the former is built 
around two location parameters (the regime switching points between inner and two 
outer  regimes)  whereas  the  latter  one  utilizes  only  one  location  parameter  (the 
midpoint of the inner regime). Both of them have their own pros and cons but in this  
paper  we do not  need to  go deeper  to  them. Furthermore,  there are  widely used 
autoregressive  versions  of  all  of  the  above  mentioned  STR-models  (i.e.  STAR-
models), which are utilized especially in explaining the mean-reversion property of 
real exchange rates. For example, Korhonen (2005) uses ESTAR-model and finds 
that real exchange rates follow random walk when deviations from PPP are small but 
become increasingly mean-reverting when deviations increase.
Sarno et al. (2006) utilize ESTR-model and find that small deviations from UIP are 
normal in the foreign exchange market and not due to large market inefficiencies. 
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Their weekly data consists of spot and 1- and 3-month forward exchange rates for 
dollar, yen, pound, franc, and German mark/euro in 1985-2002. The authors claim 
that a certain range of deviations is caused by limits to speculation and opportunity 
costs  of  capital.  When  currencies'  Sharpe  ratios are  small,  even  statistically 
significant deviations do not attract speculative capital to exploit them because their 
economic  importance  is  too  small  and  there  exist  more  attractive  investment 
opportunities (the inner regime). However, when Sharpe ratios are large enough, the 
deviations are corrected rapidly towards the UIP condition (the outer regimes). Thus, 
it is the size of the deviation that induces the mean-reversing behaviour of exchange 
rates.
Also Baillie and Kilic (2006) find strong nonlinearity in the relationship between 
spot and forward exchange rates. Their data comprises of monthly observations of 
spot  and 1-month  forward exchange rates  for  G10 currencies  in  1978-2002.  The 
authors use LSTR1-model and find that it is not only the size but also the sign of the 
forward  premium that  matter.  The deviations  from UIP are  persistent  when U.S. 
dollar's forward premium is negative (i.e. discount) or relatively small positive. This 
means that UIP fails particularly when U.S. interest rates are high and the dollar is 
expected to depreciate.  In turn,  when positive forward premium is  large enough, 
adjustment towards UIP state happens fast.  In other words,  UIP holds when U.S. 
interest rates are low and the dollar is expected to appreciate. Earlier also Wu and 
Zhang (1996) have obtained similar  results.  What  could explain this  documented 
asymmetry? Baillie and Kilic discuss the familiar explanations of transactions costs, 
limits to speculation, and heterogeneous investors, but perhaps there is something 
more. The explanation could have much to do with the central roles of U.S. economy 
and the dollar in global economy. For example, Menkhoff et al. (2012) find signs that 
in addition to  time-varying volatility risk,  carry trade excess returns are related to 
”dollar risk factor”, which means other currencies' tendency to simultaneously either 
appreciate or depreciate against the dollar. Being a safe-haven currency, the dollar 
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has not been viewed as highly risky even at times of high interest rates in the 1970s 
and 1980s. High interest rates with little risk tempt investments that indeed explains 
why the dollar has not depreciated like predicted by UIP.
Interest  rate  differential  is  not  always  used  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  STR-
models.  For  instance,  Christiansen  et  al.  (2010)  explain  carry  trade  returns  by 
LSTR1-model  that  has  two  independent  variables:  equity  and  bond  returns. The 
authors try six different transition variables and find that TED spread and foreign 
exchange  market  volatility  work  better  than  VIX,  bid-ask  spread,  order  flow  of 
JPY/USD, and equity market volatility.  Liquidity and volatility factors have high 
correlation with each other that is not surprising as typically liquidity is lower and 
volatility higher during market turbulence. Moreover, the authors argue that liquidity 
and volatility have direct effect on asset returns. Carry trade returns are positively 
correlated with equity returns and negatively correlated with bond returns, illiquidity, 
and volatility. The correlations increase dramatically in turbulent times when equity 
markets traditionally lose value and bond markets gain. In fact, in normal times there 
cannot be seen any correlation between carry trade and bond returns.  Equity and 
bond returns can explain part of the carry trade returns namely because all financial 
markets are regime-dependent and co-move during market turmoil when illiquidity 
and volatility are higher.
I do not succeed to find significant linear correlation between carry trade and equity 
market returns, see Table 6, which is surprising as they both fall in the category of 
risky assets. In fact, the sign of the beta coefficient shows to another direction than 
proposed by Christiansen et al.  When testing the relationship with LSTR1-model, 
there emerges some significance with the present S&P 500 returns (not lagged) but it 
is not as strong as using interest rate difference as an explanatory variable.
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Table 6. OLS regression for carry trade returns.
Independent 
variable
Alpha t-value of alpha Beta t-value of beta R²
One-day lagged 
S&P 500 returns
0.0002 (1.5462) -0.0120 (-1.5382) 0.0006
S&P 500 returns 0.0002 (1.5507) -0.0150 (-1.9165) 0.0009
8.4 Modelling
Like the results from Table 3 showed, we can form our linear base model by taking 
UIP as the independent  variable.  After  all,  interest  rate  differential  is  the starting 
point  for  carry trade.  With carry trade there is  no underlying theory offering the 
appropriate  transition  variable.  However,  since our  theoretical  background claims 
and empirical  evidence shows that the carry trade returns  vary depending on the 
business cycle, i.e. predicted carry trade returns are high at the bottom of a business 
cycle and low at the top of a boom, we can try various indicators of recession and 
investors' risk-aversion. In this paper I try the following three transition variables, 
which all aim to answer to question how financial risk and risk-aversion is changing.
 VIX
 TED spread calculated as a difference between 3 month T-bill and LIBOR
 Credit  spread  calculated  as  a  difference  between  10-year  maturity  U.S. 
government bond and Moody's Baa-rated corporate bonds
Since  widening  TED and  credit  spreads  as  well  as  increasing  VIX are  signs  of 
turbulence, I needed to change the sign for all of these potential transition variables 
in order to make the model work according to our theory. Now when z t is increasing/
(decreasing) or equally getting better/(worse), G approaches 1/(0). When G is 0.5, z t 
is equal to the location parameter c. When G approaches zero, exchange rate change 
follows linear UIP model, see equation (11).
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Δ S t→T=α l+β l(rt
*−rt)+ε t →T (11)
When G is larger than zero, exchange rate change becomes nonlinear depending on 
the value of the transition function G. STR-model can also be viewed as linear model 
with time-varying parameters, see equation (12). Footnotes l and nl stand for linear 
and nonlinear, respectively.
Δ S t→T=(α l+G∗α nl)+(β l+G∗β nl)(r t
*−r t)+ε t →T (12)
All the exogenous variables are one-day lagged compared to the actual exchange rate 
changes. Because of the similar daily frequency, we do not have any overlap with our 
data.  Hence,  our  parameter  and standard  error  estimates  should  be  valid  without 
correction.  The  independent  variable,  i.e.  predicted  exchange  rate  change  of  the 
portfolio,  naturally does not  vary much because interest  rates are very persistent. 
Still, Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with nonzero mean (i.e. includes an intercept) 
shows that the interest rate differential does not contain unit root. All the transition 
variables either contain unit roots (TED spread and credit spread) or are close to unit 
root  processes  (VIX).  For  purposes  of  forecasting  or  building  a  trading strategy, 
persistence of a transition variable is not a bad thing because it helps to identify the 
regime changes more accurately than more randomly varying variables.
8.5 Results
The hypothesis of linearity is rejected for all of the transition variables. Based on the 
information  criteria,  TED  spread  seems  to  work  best.  Table  7  shows  parameter 
estimates  for  our  STR-model,  where  interest  rate  differential  is  the  independent 
variable  and TED spread  the  transition  variable.  Only gamma is  not  statistically 
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significant.  Location parameter  is  TED spread of 4,  which we can utilize in  our 
trading strategy. Model's R² is low but it is higher than with linear models.
Table 7. Parameter estimates for the STR-model.
Parameter Estimate t-value
Alpha (linear) 0.0386 4.89
Beta (linear) 295.35 5.35
Alpha (nonlinear) -0.0372 -4.77
Beta (nonlinear) -284.63 -5.23
Gamma 2.1493 1.61
C -4.0481 -4.73
Std dev of residuals 0.0065
R² 0.0142
Based  on  Figures  8  and  9,  modelled  exchange  rate  changes  do  not  capture  too 
precisely the noise of actual changes. The higher volatility from 2009 onwards is not 
captured at all by the model. Still, the overall large outlines are similar and volatility 
clustering is centered for 2008.
Figure 8. Actual exchange rate changes.
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Figure 10 shows the model's transition function G over time. Most of the time G is 
close to value of 1 meaning that also the nonlinear part of the model works collecting 
risk premium. Like Figure 4 showed, TED spread has widened moderately in 1998 
and 2004 and hugely in 2008 that can be seen from the transition function. During 
the last crash only the linear part of the model works (G is close to 0) indicating that 
the risk materialized.
Figure 9. Modelled exchange rate changes.
Figure 10. Transition function over the research period.
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Figure 11 shows the transition function once more. When TED spread is below 2, G 
is close to 1 meaning that the nonlinear part of the model works fully. From 2 on the 
value  of  G  starts  to  decrease  indicating  that  the  carry  trade  returns  should  be 
decreasing as well. The gamma value slightly above 2 means that the speed of the 
transition is moderate that can be seen also from the figure.
Misspecification tests reveal that there still remains nonlinearity in the relationship 
between interest rate differential and exchange rate change. The model's residuals are 
not serially correlated (Figure 12) but there remains heteroskedasticity (Figure 13), 
which we should try to understand. It may signal unknown time-series dependencies 
that were not captured by the model. Due to these imperfections, we cannot be 100% 
satisfied with our STR-model. What we can do next is to build a trading strategy 
based on the model and test whether it yields a better performance than simple carry 
trade strategy.
Figure 11. Crossplot of the transition function and the transition variable.
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8.6 Trading strategy utilizing the previous results
Our strategy changes the signs of long and short positions when the regime changes 
(i.e. when TED spread crosses the location parameter at value of 4) aiming to take 
advantage of the different behaviour of exchange rates between the regimes. Then,  it 
Figure 12. Residuals.
Figure 13. Squared residuals.
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can be found out whether using TED spread as a signal creates economic value. Of 
course, this predictability coming from the transition variable never means for sure 
but it is just to know that odds may be on your side. There can be numerous false 
alarms before hitting the target, e.g. investor could open carry trade position too late 
or close it too early resulting in worse trading results than would have been by simple 
carry trade strategy.  Table 8 shows that the successful timing based on changes in 
risk-aversion improved substantially carry trade returns. Mean excess return is now 
7.5% and median 11.5%. Also skewness is smaller.
Table 8. Summary statistics for annualized excess returns of the strategy (%).
Min -100.00
Max 3.33*107
Mean 7.52
Median 11.53
Std dev 10.24
Skewness (t-value) -0.26 (-6.74)
Excess kurtosis (t-value) 9.79 (125.36)
Sharpe 0.73
Sortino 0.91
Even more remarkable is that the cumulative returns based on the strategy (Figure 
14) are almost 200%, i.e. the initial investment is tripled whereas the simple carry 
trade  portfolio  had to  settle  for  returns  of  50% that  just  beat  moderate  level  of 
inflation (2.5% per year). In long-term investment cumulative returns tell much more 
than mean returns particularly if there has been a crash. For curiosity, I tried also a 
strategy that changed regimes at TED spread of 3 (plot X in Figure 14), in which 
Figure 11 indicated the transition function to speed up considerably.  This yielded 
even better outcome. The cumulative returns are close to 250%. Hence, even STR-
modelling proposed a location parameter of 4, value 3 turned out to be better as it 
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changed the sign of the positions earlier.  TED spread of 3 was already a sign of 
turbulence and therefore waiting until it got to 4 would have lost the beginning of the 
2008 crash/profit-making opportunity.
Figure 14. Cumulative returns of the portfolio (P), the strategy (S), and the experiment (X).
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9 CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to seize the forward premium puzzle and form an overall 
picture that surrounds the carry trade. As the equilibrium models are based on pure 
assumptions, which seldom hold true in the real world,  the future exchange rates 
cannot  be  predicted  by  using  these  models  alone.  Investors  heterogeneity  and 
psychological biases definitely impact trading decisions and thus exchange rates, as 
do  the  institutional  features  of  the  foreign  exchange  market.  However,  they  are 
probably not the sole source of the UIP deviations and subsequent carry trade excess 
returns. Most of the financial literature emphasizes that if UIP does not hold, there 
must be a risk premium that explains the difference. Clearly the risk premium is not 
constant over time since the research has not been able to capture it in order to make 
forward exchange rates unbiased predictors of future spot exchange rates. The risk 
premium  appears  to  be  nonlinearly  connected  with  interest  rate  differentials  in 
contrast  to  linear  presumption  of  UIP.  The joint-hypothesis  problem is  important 
since risk premiums (especially time-varying) are unobservable directly. Thus, none 
of the risk factors identified in this paper are easy to be proven completely right or 
wrong.
The main contribution of this paper was to emphasize the role of risk-aversion in 
determining the carry trade returns. Indeed, there is lots of evidence that carry trade 
gains in normal times when risk-aversion is lower and loses in times of turbulence. 
The famous classification “picking up nickels in front of steamrollers” describes how 
carry  trade  is  vulnerable  to  any  sudden  reversal  in  exchange  rates.  Financial 
turbulence  is  often  associated  with  extreme  returns  and  the  convergence  of 
uncorrelated assets.  Flight-to-quality phenomenon together with decreasing funding 
liquidity explain the reported correlations between risky assets in one hand and safer 
investments  on  the  other.  If  it  is  possible  to  identify  current  and  future  market 
conditions, investors are able to enjoy steady carry trade profits during good times 
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and turn around the strategy or acquire alternative investments for market turmoil. 
Like the results showed, turning the 2008 crash into profit-making opportunity was 
crucial for the overall cumulative returns. This was possible by using one of the risk-
aversion indicators as a trading signal.  In our case,  TED spread worked best but 
based on the initial modelling also credit spread and VIX would have given similar 
results.  Hence,  we can conclude that  the LSTR1-model  works and exchange rate 
movements can be forecasted (to some extent) by the combination of interest rate 
differential  and  change  in  risk-aversion,  which  acts  as  a  trigger  between  slow 
appreciation regime and rapid depreciation regime. The final remark is to remind that 
one should be cautious in future trading since markets do evolve over time and what 
has worked in the past (e.g. TED spread around 3-4), may not work in the future. For 
future research I would recommend to test my findings in a different time period. 
Also it would be very interesting to see corresponding results with other currencies 
and different interest rate maturities.
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